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Cinderella’s Slipper: A Better Approach to 
Regulating Cryptoassets as Securities 
 




The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) seeks both to protect 
investors and to promote efficient capital formation, but in the context of 
cryptoassets these goals sometimes collide. The SEC vigorously reacts to 
fraudulent offerings of cryptoassets but has had to do so by forcing crypto 
into an antiquated framework designed with very different interests in mind. 
Even worse than the convoluted and complex arguments needed to force 
crypto into the existing category of “investment contracts,” once crypto is 
treated as a security, a host of onerous and inapt disclosure requirements and 
regulations follows. Developers, promoters, exchanges, and others who 
might assist in the sale of such assets are all forced into a regime that was 
never intended to cover this new class of assets. 
This Article therefore suggests changes to the existing regulatory 
regime to more fairly apportion duties and responsibilities between 
regulators, issuers, promoters, and purchasers. This Article suggests that 
the SEC is the appropriate agency to oversee transactions in cryptoassets, 
but the underlying legislation should be amended to create a new category of 
securities, with different disclosure requirements and exemptions tailored to 
the informational needs of potential crypto purchasers. Maintaining the 
current anti-fraud rules will protect the public while allowing for innovation 
in this rapidly moving space. It will avoid wasting assets of both regulators 
and the regulated by eliminating the debate over whether crypto is or is not 
a security and will avoid duplication of efforts between the SEC and other 
federal regulators. It will also improve the relevance of available information 
for potential purchasers. This approach has the dual advantage of facilitating 
 
* Carol R. Goforth is a University Professor and the Clayton N. Little Professor of Law at 
the University of Arkansas, in Fayetteville. She has decades of experience with corporate, 
securities and business law issues in the U.S., and has recently published a number of 
articles and blog posts dealing with the regulation of cryptotransactions. She is also the 
author of REGULATION OF CRYPTOTRANSACTIONS (West Academic, 2020). 
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both parts of the SEC’s mission: protecting investors while supporting 




In the original Grimm fairy tale, one of Cinderella’s stepsisters 
“cuts off her toes, and the other her heel so they can both fit into the 
tiny glass slipper.”1 There was no other way for them to make their 
feet fit into the shoe that was intended for someone else. 
Unfortunately, there are some parallels between this tale and the 
SEC’s current approach to cryptoassets.2 To date, the SEC has worked 
to force cryptoassets into the definition of investment contract as 
described in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,3 and to impose disclosure 
obligations on issuers of cryptoassets and persons involved in sales 
and resales of crypto that are ill-fitting at best.4 
The mission of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is 
“to protect investors; maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets; 
and facilitate capital formation.”5 In furtherance of these objectives, 
 
 1. Zoë Triska, The REAL Stories Behind These Disney Movies Will Ruin Your Childhood, 
HuffPost (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/the-real-story-behind-
eve_n_4239730 [https://perma.cc/66FM-LAKU]. 
 2. The first time the SEC responded to crypto, it called the new assets “virtual 
currencies.” OFFICE OF INVESTOR EDUCATION AND ADVOCACY, SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, SEC 
PUB. NO. 153, PONZI SCHEMES USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES (2013). In an April 2019 
pronouncement, the agency chose to call the same interests “digital assets.” See Statement 
on “Framework for ‘Investment Contract’ Analysis of Digital Assets”, U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, 
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-framework-investment-
contract-analysis-digital-assets (Ap. 3, 2019). This article uses “cryptoassets” or “crypto” 
as more reflective of the terminology in the mainstream commentary on such assets. This 
terminology is also more in line with how the rest of the world tends to speak about these 
interests. As one commentator noted, “cryptoasset is a blanket term which isn’t limited to 
cryptocurrencies.” Aashish Pahwa, What is a Cryptoasset? Types of Cryptoassets [Ultimate 
Guide], FEEDOUGH, https://www.feedough.com/what-is-a-cryptoasset-types-of-
cryptoassets-ultimate-guide/ (May 19, 2018). 
 3. S.E.C. v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). 
 4. See, i.e., Carol Goforth, Using Cybersecurity Failures to Critique the SEC’s Approach 
to Crypto Regulation, 65 S. Dakota L. Rev. 433 (2020) (forthcoming) (hereinafter 
“Cybersecurity”). The SEC has itself acknowledged the difficulty of navigating between the 
competing pressures of encouraging crypto innovation while adequately protecting 
investors. Ted Knutson, Jay Clayton: SEC Balancing Crypto Innovation and Investor Protection, 
FORBES (Dec. 11, 2018, 12:22 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/tedknutson/2018/12/11/jay-clayton-sec-balancing-
crypto-innovation-and-investor-protection/?sh=279ee4083bd9. 
 5. About the SEC, SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/about.shtml (last 
modified Nov. 22, 2016). 
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the SEC has been particularly active in asserting its authority over 
transactions involving the sale of cryptoassets.6 
Clearly there are legitimate reasons for the SEC’s concern about 
crypto transactions. Crypto is an emerging technology that has 
captured the public’s interest.7 It both involves relatively large 
amounts of money8 and is subject to significant levels of abuse.9 It is 
 
 6. For a list of various SEC enforcement actions involving cryptoassets, see Cyber 
Enforcement Actions, SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/cybersecurity-
enforcement-actions (last modified Feb. 18, 2021). Note that the original releases from the 
SEC talked about crypto as “virtual currencies.” For example, in 2014 the SEC issued an 
investor alert about Bitcoin and “other virtual currency-related investments.” Investor 
Alert: Bitcoin and Other Virtual Currency-Related Investments, SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, 
https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulletins/investoralertsia_bitcoin.html (May 
7, 2014). See also SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, OFFICE OF INVESTOR EDUCATION AND ADVOCACY, 
SEC PUB. NO. 153, PONZI SCHEMES USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES (July 1, 2013). More 
recently, the SEC has apparently switched to using “Digital Assets.” SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, 
FRAMEWORK FOR “INVESTMENT CONTRACT” ANALYSIS OF DIGITAL ASSETS (last visited Feb. 
21, 2021) [hereinafter Framework]. In a joint staff statement (issued with the Office of 
General Counsel for FINRA), the SEC referred to covered cryptoassets as “digital asset 
securities.” See Joint Staff Statement on Broker-Dealer Custody of Digital Asset Securities, SEC. 
EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/joint-staff-statement-
broker-dealer-custody-digital-asset-securities, (July 8, 2019) [hereinafter Digital Asset 
Securities]. 
 7. For example, some commentators compare the development of cryptoassets to 
the internet. “[M]any pundits, both in and out of the crypto ecosystem, have likened 
Bitcoin’s parabolic rally in 2017 to the Dotcom Boom and Bust at the turn of the millennia. 
Sure, there are similarities, like the fact that both industries were revolutionary, were 
initially misunderstood and hated, and were rife with bad actors looking only to turn a 
quick buck.” Nick Chong, Crypto Adoption is Like Internet in 1990s With 50M+ Users, 
Massive Potential Left, NEWSBTC, https://www.newsbtc.com/news/crypto-adoption-is-
like-internet-in-1990s-with-50m-users-massive-potential-left/ (Apr. 25, 2019). 
 8. “The amount of money that ICOs have raised over the last two years is truly 
astonishing. In 2017, ICOs raised a total of $5.6 billion.” The Initial Coin Offering gold rush 
– the future of fundraising or just another crypto scam? BLOCKGEEKS, (updated Feb. 21, 2019), 
[https://perma.cc/QEB7-DF3W]. 
 9. To discover the range of fraudulent activities that have occurred in the context of 
crypto-offerings, one need look no further than the numerous SEC warnings and actions 
involving fraudulent crypto offerings. Investor.gov, Investor Bulletin: Initial Coin Offerings, 
SEC. EXCH. COMM’N (July 25, 2017), https://www.investor.gov/introduction-
investing/general-resources/news-alerts/alerts-bulletins/investor-bulletins-16; 
Investor.gov, Investor Alert: Public Companies Making ICO-Related Claims, SEC. EXCH. 
COMM’N (Aug. 28, 2017), https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/general-
resources/news-alerts/alerts-bulletins/investor-alerts/investor-25; Investor.gov, 
Investor Alert: Celebrity Endorsements, SEC. EXCH. COMM’N (Nov. 1, 2017), 
https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/general-resources/news-
alerts/alerts-bulletins/investor-alerts/investor-22; Statement on Cryptocurrencies and 
Initial Coin Offerings, SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/news/public-
statement/statement-clayton-2017-12-11#_ftnref8 (Dec. 11, 2017); The SEC has an 
Opportunity You Won’t Want to Miss: Act Now!, SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-88 (May 16, 2018); Investor.gov, Watch 
Out For False Claims About SEC And CFTC Endorsements Used To Promote Digital Asset 
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therefore completely understandable that the SEC wants to protect 
the investing public from the fraud that, at times, has seemed to 
permeate transactions involving cryptoassets.10 
However, because the federal securities laws were not designed 
to apply to cryptoassets, and do not identify anything like crypto as 
being within the ambit of the securities statutes, the only option for 
the SEC has been to treat crypto as “investment contracts,” one of the 
catch-all phrases contained in the federal securities laws’ definition of 
security.11 Cryptoassets, unfortunately, do not fit easily into this 
framework, with the SEC’s explanation of how to apply this test 
changing rather significantly in a relatively short period of time.12 
Moreover, the SEC is (as of the date this Article was written) involved 
in major litigation over this approach to crypto as an investment 
contract.13 
The SEC insists that it looks at all facts and circumstances under 
the Howey test,14 which requires an investment in a common 
 
Investments, SEC. EXCH. COMM’N (Oct. 11, 2018), 
https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/general-resources/news-
alerts/alerts-bulletins/investor-alerts/investor-10. 
 10. For example, one study reported that 80% of initial coin offerings (ICOs) 
conducted in 2017 were fraudulent. Ana Alexandre, New Study Says 80 Percent of ICOs 
Conducted in 2017 Were Scams, COINTELEGRAPH (July 13, 2018), 
https://cointelegraph.com/news/new-study-says-80-percent-of-icos-conducted-in-
2017-were-scams. The SEC appears to recognize these risks, steadily maintaining that 
crypto enforcement is one of its priorities. See, e.g., William Suberg, SEC Chairman Flags 
Crypto as Continued Regulatory Focus in Latest Speech, COINTELEGRAPH (Apr. 10, 2019), 
https://cointelegraph.com/news/sec-chairman-flags-crypto-as-continued-regulatory-
focus-in-latest-speech. 
 11. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, title I, § 2, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. § 77b (2006)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, title I, § 3, 48 Stat. 882 
(codified as amended 15 U.S.C. § 78c (2006)). 
 12. For a discussion of how the SEC’s position has had to evolve rapidly, see infra Part 
II.A. 
 13. On December 22, 2020, the SEC initiated what may be one of the most significant 
crypto enforcement cases to date. The commission filed a complaint against Ripple Labs 
and two insiders, Brad Garlinghouse and Chris Larsen, the current and former C.E.O.’s of 
the company. SEC v. Ripple Labs, Inc., 20 Civ. 10832, Complaint (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2020). 
The lawsuit alleges that the XRP token that has been in circulation since 2013 is a security, 
and the Ripple’s ongoing sales have been illegal because of a failure to register them. See 
Carol Goforth, SEC vs. Ripple: A predictable but undesirable development, COINTELEGRAPH 
(Dec. 27, 2020), https://cointelegraph.com/news/sec-vs-ripple-a-predictable-but-
undesirable-development [https://perma.cc/XBT6-3LWP]. According to reports, the 
case is not likely to settle. Tanzeel Akhtar, Ripple, SEC Say Settlement Unlikely Before Trial 
Over Alleged Securities Violations, COINDESK (Feb. 16, 2021), 
https://www.coindesk.com/ripple-sec-say-settlement-unlikely-before-trial-over-
alleged-securities-violations [https://perma.cc/MJN7-BBXG]. 
 14. This test comes from S.E.C v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). 
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enterprise where the purchasers are hoping for profits based on the 
essential entrepreneurial efforts of others.15 In reality, however, the 
SEC has a pronounced tendency to conclude that almost all 
cryptoassets are securities. This, in turn, means that persons who seek 
to offer such assets for sale are being forced into the existing 
registration regime unless an appropriate exemption for the sale can 
be found.16 In essence, this often subjects sellers to burdensome 
disclosure and reporting obligations.17 In fact, compliance is so 
burdensome that the existing paradigm runs the risk of stifling 
desirable innovation.18 This is especially likely in the context of 
crypto-based offerings because of the extensive regulations imposed 
by other federal agencies such as the I.R.S. (which classifies crypto as 
property rather than a security),19 the Commodities Futures Trading 
Commissions (CFTC) (which says crypto is a commodity),20 and the 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) (which treats 
crypto as a virtual currency).21 This does not even consider the 
 
 15. See infra notes 28-35 for a more thorough discussion of the Howey test. 
 16. Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 (codified as amended 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2006)) 
prohibits the offer or sale of securities unless they are first registered with the SEC or an 
exemption from registration is available. 
 17. See Cybersecurity, supra note 4. 
 18. This is so even if there is only the risk that the securities laws will be found to 
apply. Thus, when the SEC issues a Framework, see supra note 6, with 38 distinct 
considerations, many of which have subparts and some of which focus on the manner of 
distribution rather than the asset being distributed, the concern over which interests will 
be subject to the disclosure obligations can by itself be overly burdensome. SEC 
Commissioner Hester Peirce shared this concern in remarks made at a May 2019 SEC 
Enforcement Forum. Comm’r Hester M. Peirce, How We Howey, SEC. EXCH. COMM’N (May 
9, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/peirce-how-we-howey-050919 [hereinafter 
Peirce Speech]. 
 19. The I.R.S. announced in March 2014 that “[f]or federal tax purposes, virtual 
currency is treated as property.” Virtual Currency Guidance, I.R.S., 
https://www.irs.gov/irb/2014-16_IRB#NOT-2014-21 (Apr. 14, 2014). In its most recent 
pronouncement on the subject, dealing with airdrops and forks, the agency continued this 
general approach. See I.R.S. Rev. Rul. 2019-24, 26 C.F.R. 1.61-1. 
 20. The CFTC first asserted jurisdiction over Bitcoin in 2015. Release Number 7231-15, 
U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, (Sept. 17, 2015), [https://perma.cc/J7Z7-
6JFG]. It did so more recently in a potential cryptocurrency offering that involved no 
future contract or swap. Keith Miller, Andrew P. Cross, and J. Dax Hansen, CFTC Flexes 
Its Regulatory Muscle in a Case Involving a Virtual Currency, VIRTUAL CURRENCY REPORT, 
https://www.virtualcurrencyreport.com/2018/01/cftc-flexes-its-regulatory-muscle-in-
a-case-involving-a-virtual-currency/ (Jan. 29, 2018). 
 21. FinCEN was one of the earliest regulatory actors in the crypto space, taking the 
position that the Bank Secrecy Act provisions applied to persons involved in certain 
transactions in “virtual currencies.” See Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Persons 
Administering, Exchanging, or Using Virtual Currencies, FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, 
https://www.fincen.gov/resources/statutes-regulations/guidance/application-fincens-
regulations-persons-administering (Mar. 18, 2013). More recently, this approach was 
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involvement of state tax, securities, and banking authorities, many of 
which also regulate crypto.22 
The focus of this Article is on how best to utilize the SEC’s 
considerable expertise and resources in addressing problems posed 
by the creation and sale of cryptoassets.23 Following this introduction, 
Part II describes the regulatory paradigm in which the SEC operates, 
including an exploration of how that regime has been applied to 
crypto. Part III then evaluates how well this system is working in the 
context of cryptoassets. Part IV considers some of the other 
suggestions for change that have been made, and Part V presents an 
alternative approach to regulation designed to strike a balance 
between the need to protect the public and the need to facilitate 
capital formation and innovation. The Conclusion reminds readers of 
why change is needed and why the suggestions in this Article could 
benefit regulators, entrepreneurs, and the public. 
 
II. REGULATION OF CRYPTO IN THE CURRENT 
SYSTEM 
 
A. CRYPTO AS A SECURITY 
 
refined but essentially continued. FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, U.S. TREASURY, FIN-2019-
G001, APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO CERTAIN BUSINESS MODELS INVOLVING 
CONVERTIBLE VIRTUAL CURRENCIES (2019). 
 22. Most commonly, state involvement with crypto focuses on the issue of whether 
crypto-based businesses are money transmitters. For a comparison of how states approach 
crypto regulation, see Frederick Reese, Bitcoin Regulation by State (Updated 2018), BITCOIN 
MARKET JOURNAL (Aug. 4, 2017, 9:49 PM), 
https://www.bitcoinmarketjournal.com/bitcoin-state-regulations/. However, state 
securities officials can also be involved. For example, in November 2018, “[t]he Securities 
Commissioner of the U.S. State of Texas … issued an Emergency Cease and Desist 
Order … against crypto investment firm My Crypto Mine and its principal Mark Steven 
Royer.” Marie Huillet, Texas Securities Commissioner Issues Cease and Desist Order to Crypto 
Investment Firm, COINTELEGRAPH (Nov. 28, 2018), 
https://cointelegraph.com/news/texas-securities-commissioner-issues-cease-and-
desist-order-to-crypto-investment-firm. 
 23. This Article assumes a basic familiarity with cryptoassets and blockchain, and 
therefore does not include an extended explanation of these terms and concepts. There are 
now several other articles that can provide this kind of background. For a consideration 
of important terminology relating to cryptoassets, see Carol Goforth, The Lawyer’s 
Cryptionary: A Resource for Talking to Clients About Crypto-Transactions, 41 CAMPBELL L. 
REV. 47 (2019). For a more general discussion of how crypto and how the U.S. securities 
laws have been applied, albeit before the most recent pronouncements from the SEC, see 
Carol Goforth, Securities Treatment of Tokenized Offerings Under U.S. Law, 46 PEPP. L. REV. 
405 (2019), and Thomas Lee Hazen, Tulips, Oranges, Worms, and Coins - Virtual, Digital, or 
Crypto Currency and the Securities Laws, 20 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 493 (2019). 
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In very general terms, the most important piece of legislation for 
persons seeking to sell securities is the Securities Act of 1933 (the ‘33 
Act).24 This act prohibits the offer or sale of securities in the U.S. 
without first being registered with the SEC or being exempt from 
registration.25 
The ‘33 Act was obviously enacted long before the development 
of cryptoassets, but the drafters of the federal securities laws certainly 
foresaw the likelihood of future developments in fundraising and the 
capital markets, even if particular innovations were not predictable. 
The certainty that business and investment opportunities would 
change over time made it important for the securities statutes to 
include terms that clearly explained what a security was, while being 
flexible enough to encompass interests developed in the future. 
Section 2 of the ‘33 Act contains a lengthy statutory definition of 
“security,” which includes terms with specific, well-understood 
meanings as well as words that are more elastic and possess less 
defined parameters.26 For purposes of crypto, the most important 
category of “securities” is anything that qualifies as an “investment 
contract.”27 
The phrase “investment contract” is not defined in the statute but 
rather by case law. In 1946, the U.S. Supreme Court held that “an 
investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act means a 
contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money 
in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the 
efforts of the promoter or a third party. . ..”28 Now simply known as 
the Howey test, this approach has been clarified so that it is clear that 
investments other than money will be sufficient,29 and minor investor 
 
 24. The ‘33 Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq. although many references to the 
Act are to sections from the Act, rather than relying on references to the U.S. Code. 
 25. This requirement appears in section 5 of the ‘33 Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77e. 
 26. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1). 
 27. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (usually ‘34 Act or Exchange Act), codified 
at 15 U.S.C. § 78, includes rules applicable to brokers and exchanges and has a definition 
that is similar albeit not identical to the definition that appears in the ‘33 Act. Compare 15 
U.S.C. § 77b(1) with 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10). Notwithstanding the differences in wording, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has indicated that the provisions should be interpreted as 
meaning the same things, or in other words, in pari materia. E.g., Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 
U.S. 332, 336 (1967). 
 28. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946). 
 29. While the Howey test originally spoke only of “money,” subsequent opinions 
have made it clear that “cash is not the only form of contribution or investment that will 
create an investment contract. Instead, the ‘investment’ may take the form of ‘goods and 
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participation will not prevent the last part of the test from being 
satisfied.30 Thus, modern courts have rephrased the Howey test as 
requiring the following elements: 
there is an investment of money (or something else of value);31 
in a common enterprise;32 
(iii)  where the purchaser expects to receive profits;33 and 
(iv)  the expectation of profits is from the essential 
entrepreneurial efforts of others.34 
Even outside the context of cryptoassets, application of the 
Howey test is neither simple nor straightforward.35 After adding in the 
complexities associated with the issuance and sale of cryptoassets, 
 
services’ or ‘some other exchange of value.’” Uselton v. Commercial Lovelace Motor 
Freight, Inc., 940 F.2d 564, 574 (10th Cir. 1991) (internal citations omitted). 
 30. Although the Court in Howey said the expectation of profits needed to be based 
“solely” on the efforts of others, the rule has also been modified or clarified over time. See 
S.E.C. v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 
U.S. 821 (1973) (finding that the appropriate inquiry is “whether the efforts made by those 
other than the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial 
efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise”). See also Hocking v. Dubois, 
885 F.2d 1449, 1455 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that the test should be whose efforts are 
“significant” and “essential”). 
 31. See Uselton, 940 F.2d at 574. 
 32. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299. The requirement of a “common enterprise” is the element 
of the Howey test that appears to have received the most comment over the years, in part 
because there is a divergence among the federal circuits. Some courts appear to require 
“horizontal commonality,” some accept “strict vertical commonality,” while others accept 
“broad vertical commonality.” See Maura K. Monaghan, An Uncommon State of Confusion: 
The Enterprise Element of Investment Contract Analysis, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 2135, 2152–63 
(1995) (discussing the various judicial applications of the Howey “common enterprise” 
element). Horizontal commonality requires that investors’ contributions be pooled 
together so their fortunes rise and fall together; strict commonality requires the investor 
and promoter or investment manager to have interests that are tied together, and broad 
commonality generally looks to whether the investor is depending heavily on the 
promoter in deciding whether to invest. Id. See also Benjamin Akins, Jennifer L. Chapman 
& Jason Gordon, The Case for the Regulation of Bitcoin Mining as a Security, 19 VA. J.L. & 
TECH. 669, 690 (2015). On the other hand, while cases and academic commentators alike 
have relied on these elements for decades, officials at the SEC have taken issue with the 
“common enterprise” requirement, suggesting in recent documents that the SEC “does 
not … view a ‘common enterprise’ as a distinct element of the term ‘investment contract.’” 
Framework, supra note 6, at 12, n.10. Ironically, the text to which note 10 is appended and 
the note itself specifically recognize that courts do treat the Howey test as requiring a 
common enterprise as a distinct element. 
 33. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299. The “expectation of profits” element has also been 
addressed numerous times. The U.S. Supreme Court held in United Housing Foundation, 
Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975), that in order for this element to be met, “the primary 
motivation for investing must be to achieve a return on the value invested.” Akins et al, 
supra note 32, at 691. 
 34. See Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, 474 F.2d at 482; Dubois, 885 F.2d at 1455. 
 35. See Id.; see also Akins, supra note 32; see also Howey, 328 U.S. at 299. 
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and in particular the incredible diversity of crypto and ways in which 
such assets are distributed,36 it is no surprise that the SEC has found 
it necessary to modify its position on cryptoassets multiple times and 
that entrepreneurs express widespread concern about the lack of 
clarity and certainty.37 
The SEC’s first position on cryptoassets was announced in 
connection with a digital venture capital fund that in some respects 
resembled conventional investment business models.38 To many it 
was not surprising that this set up was treated as involving the 
proposed sale of securities under the Howey investment contract test. 
The apparent position that this kind of crypto-business involved the 
sale of securities quickly morphed into repeated statements that all 
cryptoassets appeared to be investment contracts,39 and then that 
position evolved to exempt Bitcoin and Ether from securities 
regulation.40 The original four-part Howey analysis was then 
converted into a framework with more than three dozen distinct sub-
parts,41 and there are indications under this approach that an interest 
that is a not a security at one point might later become one, or vice 
 
 36. Although Bitcoin and the first altcoins shared similar characteristics, generally 
having been designed simply to substitute for fiat currencies, there are now a wide range 
of interests that can function as cryptoassets. Some crypto might involve tokenized equity 
or debt interests. For example, a cryptotoken might include the right to repayment of the 
purchase price with interest, in lieu of more conventional bonds or debentures (depending 
on whether the repayment obligation is secured). Alternatively, a cryptoasset might be 
designed to function as an equity interest, conveying a right to share in an underlying 
business venture’s anticipated profits or appreciation, possibly even giving voting rights 
on certain matters. In these cases, requirements designed for conventional debt or equity 
securities would make sense. On the other hand, crypto can have a wide range of 
functions, including membership privileges, rights of access, payment rights, the ability 
to stake claims to underlying assets or services, or otherwise. Treating all of these assets 
as if they all work in the same way creates a host of problems. 
 37. Even after the more recent guidance from the SEC in April 2019, one 
commentator expressly complained that the SEC “has so far failed to provide any reliable 
guidance as to which criteria it uses to determine whether a token qualifies as a security.” 
Diego Zuluaga, The SEC Can’t Keep Kik-ing the Crypto Can Down the Road, COINDESK (June 
5, 2019, 18:45 UTC) [https://perma.cc/Y9JM-MHPQ]. The frustration evident in that 
comment is repeated by those involved in crypto businesses. See, e.g., Laura Shin, Crypto 
Companies and Investors Fed Up With The SEC, FORBES (May 29, 2019, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/laurashin/2019/05/29/crypto-companies-and-
investors-fed-up-with-the-sec/?sh=49189da47701 (noting that crypto entrepreneurs have 
“been impatient with the lack of clarity from the SEC for months, or earnestly developing 
workarounds right into their technology so as to not serve U.S. customers…”). 
 38. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 39. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 40. See infra Part II.A.3. 
 41. See infra Part II.A.4. 
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versa.42 Recent no-action letters point to a very limited set of 
circumstances under which new cryptoassets are not likely to be 
securities,43 leaving most crypto businesses in a very uncomfortable 
and uncertain position. The following paragraphs trace through these 
developments in somewhat cursory fashion. 
 
i. The DAO Report (2017) 
 
The initial position of the SEC with regard to when crypto should 
be treated as a security came in 2017,44 in connection with an offering 
of DAO tokens.45 The DAO was the brainchild of Slock-it, a foreign 
company established by some of the founders of the Ethereum 
blockchain.46 As described in the SEC’s 2017 report, The DAO “began 
as an effort to create a ‘crowdfunding contract’ to raise ‘funds to grow 
[a] company in the crypto space.’”47 In other words, the plan was that 
The DAO would operate as a kind of venture capital fund for other 
crypto projects.48 Ownership of DAO tokens entitled the holder to 
vote on proposals by other crypto-based businesses. Successful 
proposals would be funded by The DAO, and DAO tokenholders 
would receive a share of anticipated earnings from those projects. The 
DAO was set up in such a way that a group of curators was required 
to screen and approve potential projects before making them 
available for a vote. If approved by a curator, a proposal would be 
submitted to a vote of DAO tokenholders, and any proposals 
 
 42. See infra Part II.A.5. 
 43. See infra Part II.A.6. 
 44. SEC, Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934: The DAO, ‘34 Act Release No. 81207 (July 25, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf [https://perma.cc/F862-
YS5V] (hereinafter DAO Report). 
 45. Usually, “DAO” stands for decentralized autonomous organization, which is an 
entity that is organized on a blockchain and operates through smart contracts. By coding 
the rules by which an organization is to operate on a blockchain, the organization becomes 
both decentralized and autonomous. “The DAO” project was a specific example of this 
kind of entity. 
 46. The coding for The DAO was developed by Slock.it, a German corporation 
created by some of the founders and early members of the Ethereum Community. For a 
recital of the facts surrounding the creation, rise, and fall of The DAO, see Samuel Falkon, 
The Story of the DAO — Its History and Consequences, Medium (Dec. 24, 2017), 
https://medium.com/swlh/the-story-of-the-dao-its-history-and-consequences-
71e6a8a551ee [https://perma.cc/LU7M-BDM5]. 
 47. DAO Report, supra note 44, at 4. 
 48. Falkon, supra note 46. 
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receiving a 20% vote of the total of outstanding tokens would be 
funded.49 
Approximately 1.15 billion DAO tokens were issued in May 2016 
in exchange for other tokens (Ether) then worth about $150 million,50 
making it one of the largest early ICOs (Initial Coin Offerings) to 
occur on the Ethereum platform.51 The DAO failed not because of 
intervention by the SEC but as a result of an infamous hacking 
incident.52 That episode eventually led to a much-publicized hard 
fork of the Ethereum blockchain. 
At this time, the SEC’s Division of Enforcement was 
investigating whether The DAO, its founders, and various 
intermediaries had violated U.S. securities laws by selling interests in 
The DAO in the U.S. without registering the offering or complying 
with any of the exemptions from registration. In July 2017, the SEC 
released its report.53 After describing the offering, the SEC concluded 
that the tokens sold by The DAO were “investment contracts” under 
 
 49. DAO Report, supra note 44. 
 50. Id. at 2-3. 
 51. The entire process is described in some detail in the DAO Report, supra note 44 at 
4-8. “ICO” was the label used to describe most early public sales of cryptoassets. While 
ICOs continue to occur, other kinds of distributions have been gaining in popularity. See, 
i.e., Sam Stone, Binance and the Rise of the Initial Exchange Offering (IEO), Medium (Jun 12, 
2019), https://medium.com/cointracker/binance-and-the-rise-of-the-initial-exchange-
offering-ieo-c45802e97fd3 [https://perma.cc/M7ER-FZPM]; Yuvai Halevi, ICO vs STO: 
All You Need to Know About the New Fundraising Method in the Crypto World, HackerNoon 
(Jan. 8, 2019), https://hackernoon.com/ico-vs-sto-all-you-need-to-know-about-the-new-
fundraising-method-in-the-crypto-world-54a1a43a08d6 [https://perma.cc/3FUY-
ZDCZ]; and Alvin Hagg, ICO vs STO vs IEO, FreeWallet (May 21, 2019), 
https://freewallet.org/blog/ico-sto-ieo. 
 52. The DAO also included an “out” in the event that the community invested in a 
proposal that a particular investor objected to, otherwise known as the “split function.” 
The split function allowed users to back out of The DAO by creating a “Child DAO,” to 
which contributed Ether would be returned after 28 days. On June 17, 2016, unidentified 
hackers found a loophole in this “split function,” which allowed them to drain 3.6 million 
Ether (then worth about $70 million) by requesting multiple refunds of the same tokens 
before The DAO could update its records. The end result was a division in the Ethereum 
community. 
The community at first considered a soft fork that would have blacklisted transactions 
from The DAO, but this was ultimately determined not to be a viable solution. Instead, 
the community split on the hard fork solution, which was designed to return the stolen 
Ether. Approximately 89% of Ether holders voted for this alternative, and it occurred in 
July of 2016, allowing the Ethereum Foundation to recover the stolen funds by unwinding 
certain transactions. This “hard fork” (essentially a mandatory revision to the coding of 
the smart contract) had “the sole function of returning all the Ether taken from The DAO 
to a refund smart contract.” 
 53. See DAO Report, supra note 44. 
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the Howey test.54 The SEC considered what it deemed to be the 
elements of Howey, beginning with the requirement that there be an 
investment of money.55 The absence of a cash payment was found to 
be irrelevant, and instead, the SEC concluded that the payment of 
other cryptoassets was a sufficient contribution of value.56 The second 
articulated element was the requirement that there be “a reasonable 
expectation of profits.”57 The payment of dividends or other periodic 
distributions from funded projects, such as those contemplated by 
The DAO, was found to meet this requirement.58 The last identified 
element, whether the investors were relying on the managerial efforts 
of others, received a more detailed analysis.59 
In concluding that this final element was present, the SEC 
focused first on the fact that “[t]he efforts of Slock.it, Slock.it’s co-
founders, and The DAO’s curators were essential to the enterprise.”60 
As noted by the SEC, “[t]he creators of The DAO held themselves out 
to investors as experts in Ethereum, the blockchain protocol on which 
The DAO operated, and told investors that they had selected persons 
to serve as Curators based on their expertise and credentials.”61 The 
selected curators had the power and responsibility to “(1) vet 
Contractors; (2) determine whether and when to submit proposals for 
votes; (3) determine the order and frequency of proposals that were 
submitted for a vote; and (4) determine whether to halve the default 
quorum required . . ..”62 The proper exercise of these powers was 
deemed by the SEC to constitute essential managerial efforts. 
In addition, the SEC articulated several ways DAO tokenholders’ 
voting rights were restricted,63 further supporting the agency’s 
conclusion that investors had to be relying on others. First, 
tokenholders could only vote on proposals that were pre-approved 
 
 54. Id. at § III.B.1, p. 11 (noting that “[a]n investment contract is an investment of 
money in a common enterprise with a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from 
the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.”). 
 55. Id. at § III.B.2, p.11. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at § III.B.3, p. 11. 
 58. Id. at § III.B.3, p. 11-12 (finding that “The DAO was a for-profit entity whose 
objective was to fund projects in exchange for a return on investment.”). 
 59. Id. at § III.B.4, p. 12-15. 
 60. Id. at § III.B.4(a), p. 12. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at § III.B.4(a), p. 13. 
 63. Id. at § III.B.4(b), p. 13-15. 
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by the curators,64 with limited information.65 Proposals were not 
subject to feedback, instead being presented on a take-it or leave-it 
basis.66 Tokenholders were widely dispersed, making it difficult for 
them to effectuate concerted change.67 Even though online forums 
allowed communication, those were pseudonymous, making them 
an impractical mechanism for consolidating control.68 
Given the combination of the important role of the curators and 
the practical barriers to effective communication and concentration of 
control by the tokenholders, the SEC concluded that The DAO’s 
tokens were investment contracts. Because they had been sold 
without registration or an exemption, the sales violated the ‘33 Act 
prohibitions. The SEC declined to impose penalties because The DAO 
had immediately cooperated with the investigation, the operation 
had shut down (as a result of the hack), and funds had been returned 
to purchasers. 
 
ii. Everything is a Security (2017-18) 
 
The 2017 DAO Report was issued amidst a spate of critical 
statements made by SEC leadership in the context of ICOs, which had 
been quickly gaining in popularity since the initial success of The 
DAO offering in 2016. For example, in September 2017, Co-Director 
of the SEC’s Enforcement Division, Steven Peikin, analogized persons 
seeking quick profits from ICOs to cockroaches.69 Beginning in 
December 2017, then then-Chairman of the SEC, Jay Clayton, began 
repeating the mantra that most, if not all, ICOs involved the sale of 
 
 64. Id. at 14. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at § III.B.4(b), p. 14. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 15. 
 69. Rachel-Rose O’Leary, ‘Roaches’: SEC Chief Speaks Out Against Malicious ICOs, 
CoinDesk (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.coindesk.com/roaches-sec-chief-speaks-
malicious-icos [https://perma.cc/4T3L-FCW2]. Shortly before these remarks, the SEC 
announced that trading in three blockchain-related companies was suspended, further 
demonstrating the SEC’s concern over crypto transactions. SEC Suspends Trading in 
Securities of Three Blockchain-Related Companies, Reed Smith (Aug. 29, 2017), 
https://www.reedsmith.com/en/perspectives/2017/08/sec-suspends-trading-in-
securities-of-three-blockchain-related-companies [https://perma.cc/M8P6-RUEZ]. See 
also Michael Mendelson, From Initial Coin Offerings to Security Tokens: A U.S. Federal 
Securities Law Analysis, 22 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 52, 69–70 (2019). 
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securities.70 In February 2018, in testimony before the Senate 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, he testified that 
“every ICO token the SEC has seen so far is considered a security . . 
..”71 While Chairman Clayton was always careful to explain that the 
SEC’s approach required a consideration of the facts and 
circumstances of each transaction,72 his comments were widely 
accepted as reflecting at least a rebuttable presumption that all ICOs 
involved the sale of securities.73 
 
iii. Except for Bitcoin and Ether (2018) 
 
In the summer of 2018, the SEC’s Director of the Division of 
Corporate Finance, William Hinman, refined this general approach 
somewhat at the Yahoo Finance Summit.74 To the surprise of some 
 
 70. See, i.e., SEC, Jay Clayton, Statement on Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin Offerings, 
SEC (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-clayton-
2017-12-11 [https://perma.cc/TY9T-MKWX] (“By and large, the structures of initial coin 
offerings that I have seen promoted involve the offer and sale of securities and directly 
implicate the securities registration requirements and other investor protection provisions 
of our federal securities laws.”). 
 71. See Joseph Young, SEC Hints at Tighter Regulation for ICOs, Smart Policies for “True 
Cryptocurrencies,” CoinTelegraph (Feb. 9, 2018), https://cointelegraph.com/news/sec-
hints-at-tighter-regulation-for-icos-smart-policies-for-true-cryptocurrencies 
[https://perma.cc/Z5KF-BXG9]. 
 72. For example, in an explanation to the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs, Chairman Clayton emphasized that “determining what falls 
within the ambit of a securities offer and sale is a facts-and-circumstances analysis, 
utilizing a principles-based framework that has served American companies and 
American investors well through periods of innovation and change for over 80 years.” 
SEC, Jay Clayton, Statement on Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin Offerings, SEC (Dec. 11, 
2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-clayton-2017-12-11 
[https://perma.cc/TY9T-MKWX] (“By and large, the structures of initial coin offerings 
that I have seen promoted involve the offer and sale of securities and directly implicate 
the securities registration requirements and other investor protection provisions of our 
federal securities laws.”). 
 73. See, e.g., Daniel C. Zinman, et al., SEC Issues Warning to Lawyers on ICOs, 
Bloomberg Law (Feb. 22, 2018), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/tech-and-telecom-
law/sec-issues-warning-to-lawyers-on-icos [https://perma.cc/FBB5-AWF9]. This source 
examines a number of recent pronouncements and actions taken by the SEC and 
concludes that “the SEC has essentially adopted a rebuttable presumption that ICO tokens 
are securities that must comply with the registration requirements of the securities laws.” 
Evelyn Cheng, The SEC Just Made it Clearer That Securities Laws Apply to Most 
Cryptocurrencies and Exchanges Trading Them, CNBC (Mar. 7, 2018, 5:14 PM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/07/the-sec-made-it-clearer-that-securities-laws-
apply-to-cryptocurrencies.html [https://perma.cc/J7CY-CEZH]. 
 74. See SEC, William Hinman, Digital Asset Transactions: When Howey Met Gary 
(Plastic), SEC (June 14, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-hinman-
061418 [https://perma.cc/H3YU-DX3K]. 
 
2021 CINDERELLA’S SLIPPER  285 
and the relief of others, Director Hinman acknowledged that not all 
cryptoassets are securities, specifically pointing to Bitcoin and Ether 
as examples of tokens that should not be viewed as securities. In the 
case of those two assets, Hinman suggested that the underlying 
network was “sufficiently decentralized,” so that “purchasers would 
no longer reasonably expect a person or group to carry out essential 
managerial or entrepreneurial efforts. . ..”75 He concluded that 
“[a]pplying the disclosure regime of the federal securities laws to the 
offer and resale of Bitcoin would seem to add little value.”76 
In his April 2018 testimony before the House Appropriations 
Committee, Chairman Clayton appeared to acquiesce in the view that 
Bitcoin, at least, would not be a security. He explained that “there are 
different types of cryptoassets. . .. A pure medium of exchange, the 
one that’s most often cited, is Bitcoin. As a replacement for currency, 
that has been determined by most people to not be a security.”77 This 
is a relatively odd rationale to adopt, since, in fact, Bitcoin generally 
does not function well as a medium of exchange, given the high 
volatility of its pricing and the relatively small number of users who 
accept this asset as payment in lieu of fiat currency.78 Nonetheless, the 
remarks appeared to confirm the SEC’s position that older, well-
established, decentralized cryptoassets might not all be securities. 
 
iv. Supplementing Howey with a “Framework” 
 
A more recent development from the SEC regarding the 
appropriate treatment of cryptoassets is also its most comprehensive. 
On April 3, 2019, FinHub (an SEC portal designed to specifically 
engage with companies using blockchain and other innovative 
technologies)79 released a detailed “Framework” explaining how the 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Neeraj Agrawal, SEC Chairman Clayton: Bitcoin is not a security, COINCENTER (Ap. 
27, 2018), https://www.coincenter.org/sec-chairman-clayton-bitcoin-is-not-a-security/ 
[https://perma.cc/S8MF-7AKH]. 
 78. In fact, one commentator has posited eight distinct reasons why Bitcoin fails as a 
currency. Alex Dumortier, 8 Reasons Bitcoin Fails as a Currency, THE MOTLEY FOOL (Ap. 18, 
2019), https://www.fool.com/slideshow/8-reasons-bitcoin-fails-currency/ 
[https://perma.cc/QU3E-3D8P]. The listed reasons include at the very outset the reality 
that Bitcoin “has virtually zero acceptance as a means of payment.” Id. 
 79. See Michael del Castillo, SEC Launches Fintech Hub To Engage With Cryptocurrency 
Startups And More, FORBES (Oct. 18, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaeldelcastillo/2018/10/18/sec-launches-fintech-
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SEC now plans to apply the Howey test to cryptoassets.80 The 
Framework refers to crypto as “digital assets,” and sets out a lengthy 
multi-factored approach to determine whether a particular form of 
crypto is a security. 
In the Framework, the SEC suggests that the first two elements 
of Howey (an investment of money or something of value,81 and a 
common enterprise82) are generally present in crypto sales.83 Most of 
the document’s discussion therefore focuses on whether a purchaser 
of a given cryptoasset has the reasonable expectation of profits 
derived from the efforts of others.84 
In analyzing the third element, the Framework sets out dozens 
of considerations, some with multiple subparts.85 While various 
characteristics are described as “especially relevant,”86 the 
Framework also notes that no single characteristic is “necessarily” 
determinative.87 Perhaps even more confusingly, the Framework 
suggests that interests may have to be reevaluated after the initial sale 
to determine whether an interest that was not originally a security 
might have become one.88 With regard to whether there is a 
reasonable expectation of profits, the Framework lists several 
characteristics and suggests that the more that are present, the more 




 80. Framework, supra note 6. The accuracy of this assertion, especially in the context 
of transactions such as airdrops, is not universally accepted. See infra note 144. For a brief 
explanation of the framework, see SEC, Bill Hinman & Valerie Szczepanik, Statement on 
“Framework for ‘Investment Contract’ Analysis of Digital Assets” (Ap. 3, 2019), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-framework-investment-
contract-analysis-digital-assets [https://perma.cc/5CVA-RYFB] (hereinafter referred to 
as “Statement.”). 
 81. “The first prong of the Howey test is typically satisfied in an offer and sale of a 
digital asset because the digital asset is purchased or otherwise acquired in exchange for 
value, whether in the form of real (or fiat) currency, another digital asset, or other type of 
consideration” Framework, supra note 6 at § II.A, p. 2. 
 82. “Based on our experiences to date, investments in digital assets have constituted 
investments in a common enterprise because the fortunes of digital asset purchasers have 
been linked to each other or to the success of the promoter’s efforts. See S.E.C. v. Int’l Loan 
Network, Inc., 968 F.2d 1304, 1307 (D.C. Cir. 1992).” Framework, supra note 6, at 2, n.11. 
 83. Id. at 2. 
 84. Framework, supra note 6, at 2-11. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at § II.C.1, p. 3. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. a 5. 
 89. Id. at § II.C.2, p. 6. 
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however, give any indication of how many of the described 
characteristics will be necessary or sufficient and does not indicate if 
any of the specified items will be weighted more heavily than the 
others. 
 
v. Now it is; Now it isn’t 
 
As previously mentioned, the Framework takes what appears to 
be the highly unusual position that a particular asset might be a 
security at one point, and then become something other than a 
security at a later point, or vice versa. In other contexts, the rule that 
“once a security, always a security” has been widely applied.90 A 
classification scheme that changes over time poses significant 
problems for crypto businesses, since even if a particular form of 
crypto is not an investment contract at the time of the initial sale or 
issuance, later events outside the control of the developer, issuer, or 
initial seller might somehow convert the interest into a security, with 
an unpredictable impact on earlier transactions.91 For example, 
suppose a crypto developer makes a token sale to persons that the 
developer has every reason to believe are purchasing for use rather 
 
 90. This is not actually a phrase typically used in connection with the investment 
contract analysis, although in practice it has generally taken a change in the nature of the 
interest being conveyed to turn something into a security when it previously lacked that 
characteristic. Consistent with this view, in Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982), the 
U.S. Supreme Court rejected the argument that a certificate of deposit could change 
character “into a security when pledged, even though it was not a security when 
purchased.” Id. at 559, n.9. Similarly, in Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701(1985), the Court 
rejected the argument that corporate stock should cease being a security if the purchaser 
acquired control of the corporation. The Court disagreed, concluding that this “would 
lead to arbitrary distinctions between transactions covered [by securities laws] and those 
that are not.” Id. at 702. 
 91. This is not at all the same thing as subsequent events that impact the availability 
of exemptions for particular sales. It is absolutely true, for example, that resales before a 
security come to rest may be integrated with initial sales, sometimes destroying the 
availability of exemptions. THOMAS LEE HAZEN & KRIS MARKARIAN, FEDERAL SECURITIES 
LAW (2011), § D. Exemptions from Registration Under 1933 Act, 2003 WL 23841279. This 
treatise explains that “[t]ransaction exemptions rise and fall with both the form and 
substance of the transaction and the nature of the participants. These exemptions, once 
available, can be destroyed when purchasers under the exemption resell the securities. 
Downstream sales have the potential to eradicate an existing exemption.” Intrastate and 
private offerings could be impacted in this way, which is why issuers are generally well 
advised to place limitations on resales. Id. In all of these cases, however, the interest is a 
security; it is only the availability of the exemption that is in question. The general 
applicability of the securities laws does not change. This is a very different scenario than 
the situation when the same interest may on day one be something other than a security, 
and on day two suddenly become one even if the interest itself has not changed. 
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than as a speculative investment. Suppose also that some of those 
tokens are resold to persons clearly hoping to make a profit on their 
investment. The presence of investors at a later date could 
conceivably convert something that was not a security into a security 
long after the initial sale. Alternatively, if the developer conducts an 
airdrop where the recipients make no contribution at all and therefore 
have no expectation of profits or anything else, it might be expected 
that this is not the sale of investment contracts. However, if the crypto 
is later sold to third parties, you could easily find investors who do 
expect profits, which could theoretically convert everything into 
securities. On the other hand, an asset that is sold as a security might 
later become something other than a security if it becomes so widely 
held that only market forces are expected to control pricing. 
The fact that a security might at some future point cease to be a 
security may not present any significant risks to entrepreneurs or 
others.92 Unfortunately, a test that does not yield consistent results 
could be highly problematic and unpredictable when something that 
is not a security at the time of sale later becomes subject to the 
requirements of the federal securities laws. 
 
vi. No Action Letters 
 
Alongside the Framework, the SEC released its first no-action 
letter opining that a newly created cryptoasset would not be a 
security under the terms described in the request.93 Unfortunately, 
factors that the SEC mentions as being important to its decision in the 
TurnKey Jet case also reveal that the no-action letter is unlikely to be 
relevant to most cryptoassets.94 First, the applicant made it clear that 
the token-generated funds could not be used to develop the 
underlying technology, which was already functional. 95 The tokens 
were to be sold at a fixed price of one dollar, and could be used only 
 
 92. For example, the SEC has hinted that the widespread distribution of both Bitcoin 
and Ether have allowed them to become so “decentralized” that they can no longer be 
considered securities. See supra Part II.A.3. Presumably, when these cryptoassets were 
originally issued, the distribution would have been narrower, meaning that the securities 
laws could have applied to the asset, which has not significantly changed its nature in the 
intervening period of time. 
 93. TurnKey Jet, Inc., Response of the Division of Corporation Finance (Apr. 3, 2019), 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/2019/turnkey-jet-040219-2a1.htm 
[https://perma.cc/E399-FSR3] (hereinafter “TurnKey Jet”). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
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to obtain air charter services. 96 Repurchases would only be made at a 
discount, and there was to be no representation that there would be 
any profit potential because the tokens were not transferable.97 It is 
the non-transferability, in particular, that radically limits the general 
usefulness of this particular no-action letter. 
A second no-action letter involving a cryptoasset was issued by 
the SEC a few months later.98 Pocketful of Quarters, referred to as 
“PoQ” in the letter, asked for the SEC to opine on its ERC-20 
“Quarters,” a token that represents a small amount ($0.0025 in Ether) 
that would be locked up on a smart contract functioning in the 
context of online gaming platforms.99 As was the case in the earlier 
TurnKey no-action letter,100 the PoQ Quarters were already 
functional, and funds raised from the sales of the tokens would not 
be used to fund development of the programming.101 In addition, the 
Quarters were not designed to be resold or transferrable outside of 
the PoQ closed platform and could not be traded between players.102 
Given these factors, PoQ represented, and the SEC relied on the 
argument, that price appreciation would be “highly unlikely, if not 
practically impossible.”103 
As with the TurnKey tokens,104 the proposed PoQ Quarters 
appear to be substantially different from typical cryptoassets. On the 
other hand, at least some commentators regarded this second no-
action letter as a progressive development since Quarters are 
potentially transferable to third-parties, albeit only on the closed PoQ 
platform.105 
 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Pocketful of Quarters, Inc., (July 25, 2019), Response of the Division of Corporation 
Finance https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/pocketful-quarters-inc-072519-2a1 
[https://perma.cc/6GTP-7Z7C] (hereinafter “PoQ”). 
 99. For a thoughtful explanation of the PoQ request and the SEC response, see 
Mitchell Moos, SEC issues no-action letter for Ethereum token “Quarters,” what it means for 
crypto, CryptoSlate (July 26, 2019), https://cryptoslate.com/sec-issues-no-action-letter-
ethereum-quarters-crypto/ [https://perma.cc/52JC-HLWJ]. 
 100. TurnKey Jet, supra note 93. 
 101. PoQ, supra note 98. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text. 
 105. Among the commentators who have applauded the PoQ no-action letter as a step 
in the right direction are Caitlan Long, a well-known and respected blockchain lawyer 
who co-founded the influential Wyoming Blockchain Coalition and Marco Santori, an 
influential fintech attorney formerly with Cooley LLP who helped develop the original 
Protocol Labs SAFT white paper. See Moos, supra note 99. 
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vii. Confusion and Uncertainty 
 
The FinHub Framework was clearly intended to be helpful to 
members of the crypto community, including developers, issuers, 
and their counsel. However, the overall utility of a framework that is 
not an official rule or pronouncement, includes 38 different 
considerations (some with additional subparts), and neither 
prioritizes nor indicates the degree of significance for any such 
consideration, is questionable at best. 
Shortly after the Framework and TurnKey no-action letters were 
released, SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce gave a speech addressing 
her concerns about the approach suggested by the new document.106 
Her assessment of the Framework was less than glowing, noting that 
the document could “raise more questions and concerns than it 
answers.”107 As she observed: 
While Howey has four factors to consider, the framework lists 38 
separate considerations, many of which include several sub-points. A 
seasoned securities lawyer might be able to infer which of these 
considerations will likely be controlling and might therefore be able 
to provide the appropriate weight to each. . . . [N]on-lawyers and 
lawyers not steeped in securities law and its attendant lore will not 
know what to make of the guidance. Pages worth of factors, many of 
which seemingly apply to all decentralized networks, might 
contribute to the feeling that navigating the securities laws in this area 
is perilous business.108 
 
The SAFT project was an attempt to create relatively simple documentation for a two-step 
fund-raising process through which businesses would first sell contractual rights to 
tokens to be delivered when developed, followed by a second broader public distribution 
of the functional tokens. The intent was to create a process whereby companies could 
comply with one or more exemptions for the first stage of the fundraising process, which 
was anticipated to involve the sale of a security, followed by a wider sale of utility tokens 
that would not be securities and therefore would fall outside the scope of the federal 
securities laws. For a fuller discussion of the SAFT process see the whitepaper: Juan Batiz-
Benet, Jesse Clayburgh, & Marco Santori, The SAFT Project: Toward a Compliant Token Sale 
Framework (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.cooley.com/~/media/cooley/pdf/reprints/saft-
project-whitepaper.ashx [https://perma.cc/XDP4-MQU5]. 
 106. See Peirce Speech, supra note 18. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
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However, on July 8, 2019, the SEC, in a Joint Statement along 
with FINRA,109 reiterated its commitment to the positions taken in the 
Framework. This Joint Statement did, however, more definitively 
articulate the position that some cryptoassets would not be securities. 
In explaining the decision to utilize the phrase “digital asset security” 
in that statement, the SEC and FINRA explained that in their view, 
digital assets, defined to include (without limitation) virtual 
currencies, coins, and tokens, “may or may not meet the definition of 
a ‘security’ under the federal securities laws.”110 The precise 
parameters of when such interests would be regulated as securities 
were not laid out in the statement. 
 
B. KIK AND TELEGRAM 
 
The reality is that the “correct” application of the Howey 
investment contract test to cryptoassets has yet to be determined. This 
might not be surprising given that most entrepreneurs in the crypto 
space lack the resources to go head-to-head with the SEC in 
protracted litigation. It appeared this might change in the summer 
and fall of 2019 with not one but two major cases being initiated. 
On June 6, 2019, the SEC filed a lengthy complaint in the 
Southern District of New York, alleging that a Canadian social media 
company, Kik Interactive Inc., had violated the federal securities law 
by selling a trillion unregistered tokens which it called “Kin.”111 Kik 
promptly launched a crowdfunding initiative to help oppose the 
SEC’s attempted enforcement action, creating a defense fund of more 
than $5 million.112 A significant basis of its defense is that the Kin 
tokens it sold were not investment contracts.113 Kik also asserted that 
 
 109. Digital Asset Securities, supra note 6. It should, however, be noted that this 
statement is not a rule, regulation, guidance, or official pronouncement of the SEC and 
has no legal force or effect. Id. at n. 2. 
 110. Id. at n.1. 
 111. See S.E.C. v. Kik Interactive Inc., Complaint, 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2019/comp-pr2019-87.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R8KU-CJD3]. 
 112. Kik’s crowdfunding initiative, called “Defend Crypto,” collected approximately 
$1.9 million by the end of June 2019, in addition to the $5 million paid in by Kik itself. 
Nikhilesh De, Blockchain Association Takes Over Kik’s ‘Defend Crypto’ Crowdfunding Effort, 
YAHOO! FINANCE (June 28, 2019), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/blockchain-
association-takes-over-kik-130040612.html [ https://perma.cc/LM8W-2SB4]. 
 113. The Kik answer has been described as “fairly combative.” BitBlog Weekly 
Summary: Kik Kicks Back and the SEC continues its enforcement campaign against ICOs, THE 
NAT’L L. REV. (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/bitblog-weekly-
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the SEC’s approach to defining when cryptoassets were investment 
contracts is unconstitutionally vague.114 
Parallel to the Kik litigation, the SEC also initiated an 
enforcement action against Telegram Group Inc. and Ton Issuer Inc. 
(jointly referred to as Telegram in the complaint and in this Article) 
alleging that they violated the federal securities laws by conducting 
an unregistered digital token offering in the U.S. and overseas.115 
Telegram had already raised $1.7 billion from accredited investors 
who had purchased contractual rights (SAFTs)116 that were designed 
to allow them to acquire digital tokens to be known as Grams when 
those assets were released. Before the Grams could be issued, the SEC 
filed an emergency action and obtained a TRO to prevent Telegram 
from “flooding the U.S. markets with digital tokens that we allege 
were unlawfully sold.”117 
Both Kik and Telegram had significant assets at their disposal to 
fight the SEC and considerable financial incentives to oppose the SEC 
approach. The Telegram suit moved faster, and on February 19, 2020, 
the SEC and Telegram presented arguments on the “economic 
realities” of the tokens that were to be issued, presenting their 








 114. Id. 
 115. S.E.C. v. Telegram Group, Inc., No. 19 Civ. 9439 (PKC) (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 11, 
2019). A copy of the SEC’s complaint is available online at 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2019/comp-pr2019-212.pdf. 
 116. A SAFT, or Simple Agreement for Future Tokens, is a process that was designed 
to allow crypto entrepreneurs to raise funds in anticipation of the development of a 
functional “utility token.” The goal of the project was to facilitate compliant token sales 
through the sale of contractual rights that would be securities and would require 
registration or an exemption, followed by a later distribution of a functional token that 
would not qualify as an investment contract. For a fuller discussion of the SAFT process 
see the whitepaper: Juan Batiz-Benet, Jesse Clayburgh, & Marco Santori, The SAFT Project: 
Toward a Compliant Token Sale Framework (Oct. 2, 2017), 
https://www.cooley.com/~/media/cooley/pdf/reprints/saft-project-whitepaper.ashx 
[https://perma.cc/XDP4-MQU5]. Both the Kik and Telegram sales were conducted 
through SAFTs or SAFT-like processes. 
 117. SEC, Press Release, SEC Halts Alleged $1.7 Billion Unregistered Digital Token 
Offering (Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2019-212 
[https://perma.cc/759K-97DH]. 
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On March 24, 2020, the court granted the SEC’s request for a 
preliminary injunction, halting the proposed sale of Grams on the 
grounds that the SEC had “shown a substantial likelihood of success 
in proving that the contracts and understandings . . . would be an 
integral part of the sale of securities without a required registration 
statement.”118 Telegram sought to limit the scope of the order to U.S. 
purchasers, but on April 1, 2020, Judge Castel refused to limit his 
ruling on the basis that there was a substantial risk of resales to U.S. 
citizens.119 Telegram abandoned its proposed crypto-offering in the 
wake of this decision,120 discontinuing an appeal to the Second Circuit 
and agreeing to return $1.2 billion to investors worldwide and to pay 
a fine of $18.5 million to the SEC.121 
On September 30, 2020, the court ruled in favor of the SEC on its 
motion for summary judgment, concluding that the “two phases” of 
the Kik offering were intertwined so that the sale of contractual rights 
and the eventual public offering of Kin tokens were part of a single 
plan of financing with a single purpose amounting to “an 
unregistered offering of securities that did not qualify for 
exemption.”122 The judge relied on an extensive analysis of the Howey 
investment contract test in determining that the Kik had conducted 
an illegal sale of securities.123 
The ultimate impact of these two decisions, both of which came 
out of the Southern District of New York, is uncertain. There is no 
way of knowing if other courts will agree with the analysis employed 
in those cases, and that uncertainty is likely to continue until and 
 
 118. S.E.C. v. Telegram Group, Inc., No. 19 Civ. 9439 (PKC) at 2 (S.D.N.Y., order of 




 119. See S.E.C. v. Telegram Group Inc, No. 1:2019cv09439 - Document 234 (S.D.N.Y. 
2020), https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-
york/nysdce/1:2019cv09439/524448/234/ [https://perma.cc/G585-TSFC]. 
 120. See Kevin Helms, Telegram Drops TON Cryptocurrency Project After US Prohibits 
Global Distribution, Bitcoin.com (May 13, 2020), https://news.bitcoin.com/telegram-ton-
cryptocurrency/ [https://perma.cc/9K2N-VWTU]. 
 121. SEC Press release, Telegram to Return $1.2 Billion to Investors and Pay $18.5 Million 
Penalty to Settle SEC Charges, Rel. 2020-146 (June 26, 2020) 
(https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2020-146). 
 122. SEC v. Kik Interactive Inc., No. 19 Civ. 5244 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2020) 
(Opinion and Order on Motions for Summary Judgment) at 17, 
https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/15722539/88/us-securities-and-exchange-
commission-v-kik-interactive-inc/ [https://perma.cc/43WJ-K7JA]. 
 123. Id. at 8-14. 
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unless the Supreme Court issues a definitive ruling on the subject. 
Until then, considerable resources are being devoted to the 
preliminary question of whether and when crypto is within the 
regulatory authority of the SEC, a problem for entrepreneurs and 
regulators alike. Not only is the lack of clarity inefficient, it stifles 
innovation with no clear offsetting benefits. And, in the final analysis, 
even if crypto is eventually found to be a security by the courts in 
most cases, the underlying regulatory framework is still out of step 
with the needs of potential entrepreneurs and investors alike. 
 
C. TO WHOM DO THE REQUIREMENTS APPLY? 
 
Assuming that the position of the SEC is correct, and that most 
offerings of crypto do involve the sale of securities, the federal 
securities laws make it illegal to offer or sell the cryptoasset unless it 
is first registered or exempt from registration.124 The registration 
process is incredibly expensive and time consuming125 and requires 
voluminous disclosures. Much of the required information seems to 
have little direct relevance to the primary interests of crypto investors 
and some of required data is simply outside the knowledge or control 
of the issuer.126 Many potential exemptions are also expensive and 
require similar disclosures.127 They are also often complex enough to 
require the assistance of experienced securities counsel.128 
 
 124. This is the clear import of section 5 of the ‘33 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77e. 
 125. The first time a business sells its securities publicly, it is said to be conducting an 
initial public offering, or IPO. The registration expenses incurred in an IPO are costly. One 
survey conducted by Oxford Economics reported that 83% of CFOs estimated spending 
more than $1 million on one-time costs associated with the IPO, not including 
underwriting fees. Results reported in PWC, Considering an IPO to Fuel your Company’s 
Future?, https://www.pwc.com/us/en/deals/publications/assets/cost-of-an-ipo.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8P62-Q97X]. (A summary is archived at 
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/services/deals/library/cost-of-an-ipo.html 
[https://perma.cc/459M-57PS). PWC suggests that the average total cost of an IPO (with 
underwriting, legal and accounting fees included) is approximately $4.2 million. In 
addition to the expense, the time required is also significant. An IPO takes between 90 
days to 6 months to complete (from the company’s decision to go public up through the 
SEC’s declaration that the registration is “effective”), depending on the complexity of the 
underlying transactions necessary to get the company in shape for the sale. Id. at 2. 
 126. For a consideration of how the kinds of disclosures required in a registration 
mesh with the probable needs of most crypto purchasers, see Cybersecurity, supra note 4, 
at Part III.A. 
 127. Id., at Parts III.B & C. 
 128. Even attorneys are often cautioned about the complexities of the law in this arena. 
Raising capital is often a necessary step for any business seeking to grow. Although an 
ordinary, seemingly straightforward business decision, capital raising operates within a 
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The ‘33 Act prohibits all public sales of securities unless there is 
an available exemption, regardless of who created the security or 
whether the transaction involves an initial sale or a resale.129 
Fortunately, there is a general exemption for anyone other than the 
issuer, underwriter, or any securities dealer,130 but in the context of 
cryptoassets, the “issuer” of the securities may not be clear, and the 
question of who counts as an underwriter or dealer may be equally 
complicated. 
These are defined terms, but the statutory provisions were not 
written with cryptoassets in mind. For example, the term “issuer” is 
defined in the ‘33 Act as “every person who issues or proposes to 
issue any securities” with certain exception for certificates of deposit; 
voting-trust certificates; unincorporated investment trusts; 
unincorporated associations, trusts, or entities providing limited 
liability to members; and undivided fractional interests in mineral 
rights.131 To say that an issuer is someone who issues something is 
completely circular, especially when “issue” is never defined. 
Perhaps in the context of conventional securities there was no 
need for greater clarity because the legal person creating the equity 
or debt interest is generally readily identifiable. That is not 
necessarily the case for cryptoassets. 
In one sense, the “issuer” of crypto is the computer program, 
which operates to create the unique string of numbers that constitutes 
the totality of a cryptoasset’s physical existence. Unfortunately, as 
mentioned above, “issuer” is defined in the federal securities laws to 
include “persons” which means legally recognized individuals, 
 
heavily regulated arena—at both the state and federal levels. The substantial regulation 
stems from the fact that when outside funding is sought for a business operation, it often, 
if not usually, involves the sale of a “security.” This is critical, as the sale of a security 
requires SEC compliance, and failure to comply can result in potentially severe 
consequences. For this reason it is imperative that attorneys practicing in this area be 
familiar with the definition of a security and how to identify when a security is present in 
order to avoid the consequences of selling a security in violation of the securities laws. 
Zachary Bruchmiller, Navigating the Private Offering Exemptions: A Guide for Practitioners, 
46 No. 1 SEC. REG. L.J. (Spr. 2018) (fn omitted). 
 129. 15 U.S.C. § 77e. 
 130. Section 4(a)(1) of the ‘33 Act exempts transactions by “any person other than an 
issuer, underwriter, or dealer.” 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a). 
 131. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(4). The ‘34 Act similarly defines “issuer” to mean “any person 
who issues or proposes to issue any security,” with a shorter list of exceptions. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78c(8). Neither the ‘33 nor ‘34 Act defines what it actually means to “issue” a security. 
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associations, and entities.132 To date, computer programs are not 
generally recognized as legal persons.133 
If you disregard the computer program, that leaves the persons 
who wrote the protocol, those who control its refinement, those who 
promote it, those who install it on their computers and act as nodes, 
and those who mine the asset (assuming the asset is one of the 
minable forms of crypto). That is an incredibly wide and diverse 
group of persons who are unlikely to be acting in concert on most 
“decisions.” The consensus protocol that replaces management 
decisions in a conventional business enterprise is so distributed for 
many cryptoassets that identifying “the” issuer responsible for 
disclosures may often be impossible. 
Consider what this means for a cryptoasset such as Bitcoin. The 
person or persons who used the pseudonym “Satoshi Nakamoto” 
wrote about the potential to create blockchains for digital assets using 
new consensus protocols in 2008 and launched the Bitcoin protocol 
with open-source software in 2009.134  Thereafter, he, she, or they 
allowed the program to operate with new Bitcoins being “created” 
and credited to Bitcoin miners in accordance with the terms of the 
underlying software. Who is “issuing” those cryptoassets? No one 
has definitively identified the “real” Satoshi Nakamoto, and the 
 
 132. In both the ‘33 and ‘34 Acts, “person” is also specifically defined. In the ‘33 Act, 
the definition is “an individual, a corporation, a partnership, an association, a joint-stock 
company, a trust, any unincorporated organization, or a government or political 
subdivision thereof,” with further limitations on the when a “trust” is within the scope of 
the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(2). “Person” is defined in the ‘34 Act as “a natural person, 
company, government, or political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of a 
government.” 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(9). Note that neither definition of “person” references 
anything like a computer program or artificial intelligence. 
 133. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.04 (Am. Law. Inst. 2006) (“Likewise, a 
computer program is not capable of acting as a principal or an agent as defined by the 
common law. At present, computer programs are instrumentalities of the persons who 
use them.”). A decade earlier, two commentators offered three reasons for conferring legal 
personhood on autonomous computer programs, including moral expediency (which 
even the authors acknowledged to be controversial), social reality given that the law 
already recognizes other artificial legal persons, and legal expediency. See Tom Allen & 
Robin Widdison, Can Computers Make Contracts?, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 25, 35-43 (1996). 
However, it is generally accepted that, as of yet, the law has declined to extend the rights 
and responsibilities of legal personhood on computer programs. See Bert-Jaap Koops et. 
al, Bridging the Accountability Gap: Rights for New Entities in the Information Society?, 11 
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 497, 512 (2010) (“[S]o far, only natural persons, specific types of 
companies, associations, a trust fund, and public bodies have been attributed legal 
personhood.”). 
 134. Satoshi Yakamoto, Bitcoin—A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, 
[https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf.2008]. This “whitepaper” originally appeared in an 
online discussion of cryptography. 
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wallets used by that person or persons have been untapped for some 
time. We do not even know if Satoshi is still alive. But if the issuer is 
not Satoshi, who is it?  If the computer program itself cannot be the 
issuer because it is not a legal person, then this question is difficult to 
answer. 
In the context of most, but not all, cryptoassets, it is possible to 
identify the programmers, and often the legal person who has 
commissioned the development of the program. Sometimes the 
“token” is actually pre-functional and is being developed on behalf 
of an entity or association of persons as a work for hire, in which case 
the issuer may be easy to identify (as in the case of traditional 
securities). In some instances, however, the programmers may be 
working alone, and their actual identities may not be known.135 In 
addition, even if authorities can identify who wrote the code, that 
does not necessarily mean those persons are responsible for “issuing” 
the resulting digital assets. 
Further complicating matters is the definition of “underwriter” 
which as used in the ‘33 Act means: 
[A]ny person who has purchased from an issuer with a view to, 
or offers or sells for an issuer in connection with, the distribution of 
any security, or participates or has a direct or indirect participation in 
any such undertaking, or participates or has a participation in the 
direct or indirect underwriting of any such undertaking; but such 
 
 135. Obviously, the programmers know who they are, but this information is not 
necessarily shared with others. For example, in addition to Bitcoin (where no 
programmer’s identity is known), five of the seven developers for Monero have kept their 
identities secret. The Complete Guide to Monero Cryptocurrency, BITDEGREE (Dec. 31, 2019), 
[https://perma.cc/P2A9-KRYZ].In other cases, there are conflicting reports about who 
created the programming needed to develop particular cryptoassets. Cardano claims that 
it was developed by a “global team of leading academics and engineers.” What is Cardano? 
CARDANO (Jan. 17, 2020, 9:02 AM), [https://perma.cc/6UA5-T27K]. What is Cardano? 
CARDANO ROADMAP (Jan. 17, 2020, 9:09 AM), [https://perma.cc/M4UH-LAAH] 
(“Cardano is designed by a global team of experts who are leaders in disciplines ranging 
from distributed systems to programming languages and game theory and is jointly 
developed by IOHK and partners.”). Other sources credit Charles Hoskinson with being 
the “creator” of Cardano. See Marie Huillet, If Bitcoin fails, Crypto Industry in for a Bad Time: 
Cardano Founder, COINTELEGRAPH (Oct. 11, 2019), [https://perma.cc/EZS7-Z3XQ]. This 
kind of information makes it hard to pinpoint who actually developed the cryptoasset in 
question. Even where there is agreement on the identity of the development team, if the 
group is too dispersed or amorphous, identification of who has sufficient responsibility to 
make them a promoter of the asset may be challenging. For example, NEO is a 
decentralized, open-source cryptocurrency launched in China. See NEO Cryptocurrency: 
Everything You Need to Know about China Ethereum, CoinSutra (Aug. 12, 2019), 
[https://perma.cc/DU8M-FPC9]. Da Hongfei and Erik Zhang are identified as co-
founders of the platform and “co-developers,” along with “other community developers” 
and contributors. Id. 
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term shall not include a person whose interest is limited to a 
commission from an underwriter or dealer not in excess of the usual 
and customary distributors’ or sellers’ commission. As used in this 
paragraph the term “issuer” shall include, in addition to an issuer, 
any person directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by the 
issuer, or any person under direct or indirect common control with 
the issuer.136 
To determine who is considered an underwriter, it is first 
necessary to identify the issuer, since an underwriter includes anyone 
who “purchased” from the issuer or is acting for the issuer in 
connection with a distribution of securities as well as anyone 
participating in those efforts. Without knowing who counts as the 
issuer, it is virtually impossible to know who counts as an 
underwriter. In addition, there are some kinds of transactions that 
may or may not lead to someone being a potential underwriter. For 
example, can you classify the recipient of an airdrop or a crypto miner 
as a purchaser who has acquired the cryptoasset with a view to 
distributing it?137 These are not simple questions to answer. 
In addition, dealers are also ineligible for the usual exemption 
for resales.138  A “dealer” under the ‘33 Act is “any person who 
engages either for all or part of his time, directly or indirectly, as 
agent, broker, or principal, in the business of offering, buying, selling, 
or otherwise dealing or trading in securities issued by another 
person.”139 To apply this definition, it may again be necessary to know 
what other “person” “issued” the securities, although it is also 
 
 136. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(11). 
 137. An airdrop is “the process whereby a cryptocurrency enterprise distributes 
cryptocurrency tokens to the wallets of some users free of charge. Airdrops are usually 
carried out by blockchain-based startups to bootstrap their cryptocurrency projects.” What 
are “Airdrops” in Crypto World? MEDIUM (Feb 15, 2018), [https://perma.cc/DCN8-TB8E]. 
For a further description of airdrops, see Carol Goforth, It’s Raining Crypto: The Need for 
Regulatory Clarification When it Comes to Airdrops, 15 INDIAN J. OF LAW AND TECH 322, 323-
26 (2019). It should be fairly obvious why these transactions may be distinguishable from 
“purchases,” which generally required payment of something as consideration. 
 “Mining” also differs from conventional purchase transactions. Instead of “paying” the 
seller to obtain something of value, a miner participates in the process of validating and 
verifying transactions in order to add them to the blockchain’s public ledger. Successful 
mining typically requires being the first to solve a computationally difficult mathematical 
problem, which is incentivized by the reward of new cryptoassets. For a more detailed 
description of the process and what it entails, see Jason Evanelho, Mining 101: An 
Introduction To Cryptocurrency Mining, FORBES (Mar. 13, 2018), [https://perma.cc/ZPE7-
VFBX]. 
 138. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(1), see generally note 137. 
 139. 5 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(12). 
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possible that the SEC or the courts could simply say that the dealer is 
someone who did not issue the securities, meaning some other person 
had to have issued it. Thus, if an individual is “in the business” of 
trading in crypto, they could be a dealer. Since the usual function of 
many forms of crypto is to trade to make a profit (since it is relatively 
difficult to use most crypto to pay for goods or services),140 this could 
theoretically mean that almost all crypto purchasers are “dealers,” 
even if they trade only sporadically. 
The uncertain breadth of the ‘33 Act is not the only problem 
associated with classifying crypto as a security under the Howey test. 
Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (‘34 Act or Exchange Act), 
when crypto is classified as a security, anyone acting to provide 
brokerage services becomes subject to the federal securities laws.141 
As explained in a recent statement from the SEC (and FINRA), this 
can potentially apply to anyone who “buys, sells, or otherwise 
transacts or is involved in effecting transactions in digital asset 
securities for customers or its own account . . ..”142 In addition to 
serving as a trap for the unwary or uninformed, one of the potentially 
more problematic requirements when crypto brokers are regulated 
under the securities laws involves custodial requirements that even 
the SEC and FINRA recognize as including “established laws and 
practices regarding the loss or theft of a security, that may not be 
available or effective in the case of certain digital assets . . ..”143 
 
 140. A list of places where it was possible to “spend” cryptocurrencies in 2020 can be 
found at Aziz Bin Zainuddin, Spend Bitcoin: Top Places Accepting Crypto Payments in 2020, 
https://masterthecrypto.com/spend-bitcoin/ [https://perma.cc/8H58-9QR7]. Note that 
some of the sites listed accept very limited forms of crypto. 
In stark contrast to the limited venues in which to spend crypto, there are literally 
thousands of calls to “invest in” or “profit” from trading in various cryptoassets. See, 
Hunter Kuffel, How (and Where) to Invest in Cryptocurrency, SMARTASSET (Jan. 15, 2020), 
[https://perma.cc/9BS6-8X4Y] (touting the opportunity for “big gains” for those who 
tolerate big risks); How to Profit from Cryptocurrency, HACKERNOON (Ap. 20, 2019), 
[https://perma.cc/SP6K-QBS4]; Top 13 Top Ways to Make Money with Cryptocurrency (In 
2020), COINSUTRA (Dec. 9, 2019), [https://perma.cc/DA8V-YYHL]; 8 Ways to make money 
with crypto, BITSPARK (Dec. 11, 2019), [https://perma.cc/RP9U-A7WX]; How to Make 
Money Investing in Cryptocurrency (in 2019), TRADING STRATEGY GUIDES (Jul. 29, 2019), 
[https://perma.cc/FZN6-MFNR]; Ameer Rosic, How to Invest in Cryptocurrencies: The 
Ultimate Beginners Guide, BLOCKGEEKS (Feb. 21, 2019), [https://perma.cc/8C5B-QDYF]. 
 141. See Digital Asset Securities, supra note 6. 
 142. Id. These rules may require any such person to register with the SEC, and 
“become a member of and comply with the rules of a self-regulatory organization 
(“SRO”), which in most cases is FINRA.” Id. This includes financial responsibility rules 
such as those embodied in Rules 15c3-1, 15c3-3, 17a-5, and 17a-13 under the ‘34 Act. These 
rules are codified at 17 CFR §§ 240.15c3-1, 15c3-3, 17a-5, 17a-13 (1934). 
 143. Digital Asset Securities, supra note 6. See 17 CFR § 240.15c3-3 (1934). 
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Finally, there are unique problems for crypto exchanges, which 
may also be within the reach of securities regulators if the underlying 
assets are classified as securities.144 The SEC has taken the position 
that crypto exchanges are subject to these rules.145 A public statement 
issued by the SEC on November 16, 2018, explicitly declared that “[a] 
platform that offers trading in digital asset securities and operates as 
an “exchange” (as defined by the federal securities laws) must 
register with the Commission as a national securities exchange or be 
exempt from registration.”146 
Exchange Act Rule 3b-16 provides a functional test to assess 
whether an entity meets the definition of an exchange under Section 
3(a)(1) of the Exchange Act. An entity that meets the definition of an 
exchange must register with the Commission as a national securities 
exchange or be exempt from registration, such as by operating as an 
alternative trading system (“ATS”) in compliance with Regulation 
ATS.147 
This array of regulatory responses makes it very difficult for 
crypto businesses to function effectively within the borders of the U.S. 
As a result, several crypto offerings have been designed to exclude 
 
 144. Exchanges are also regulated under the ‘34 Act. See 15 U.S.C. §78c(a)(1) (defining 
“exchange,”). See also 15 U.S.C. § 78e (making it unlawful for brokers, dealers, or 
exchanges to effect transactions in securities on any unregistered, non-exempt exchange). 
 145. In the Matter of Zachary Coburn, Exchange Act Release No. 84553 (Nov. 8, 2018) 
[hereinafter EtherDelta Opinion] the SEC brought an enforcement action against Zachary 
Coburn, who had created and operated the EtherDelta crypto exchange. In that opinion, 
the SEC assessed a fine against Coburn, but provided scant guidance on why the exchange 
was subject to its jurisdiction. Following citations to the SEC’s DAO Report (see supra note 
44), the EtherDelta Opinion merely emphasizes that EtherDelta was designed to operate 
with Ether and ERC-20 tokens. EtherDelta Opinion, supra this note, at 9. This appeared to 
be sufficient for the SEC to conclude that the exchange needed to operate in compliance 
with the securities laws. Cf. Michael J. O’Connor, Overreaching Its Mandate? Considering the 
Sec’s Authority to Regulate Cryptocurrency Exchanges, 11 DREXEL L. REV. 539, 539 (2019). 
 146. Statement on Digital Asset Securities Issuance and Trading, PUBLIC STATEMENT, U.S. 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Nov. 16, 2018), [https://perma.cc/XKY2-
ZHV8]. 
 147. See SEC, Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, Exchange 
Act Rel. No. 40760 (Dec. 8, 1998), 63 FR 70844 (Dec. 22, 1998), 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-1998-12-22/pdf/98-33299.pdf. 
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U.S. investors from participating.148 The Telegram order149 makes the 
viability of this approach uncertain, but it may still be the best 
available option.150 
 
III. AN EXAMINATION OF HOW THE CURRENT 
SYSTEM IS WORKING 
 
Consider the way in which the federal securities laws have been 
applied to cryptotransactions. The focus of the ‘33 Act is two-fold: it 
requires registration or an exemption, and (regardless of whether an 
offering is registered or exempt) it prohibits deceptive, fraudulent, or 
manipulative selling practices.151 In furtherance of these objectives, 
federal law relies primarily on mandatory disclosures from persons 
seeking to sell securities to U.S. citizens. The ostensible benefits of this 
kind of disclosure regime include: (1) providing investors with a 
reasonable basis on which to make informed investment decisions; 
(2) establishing a more equitable apportionment of the costs of 
investigating and providing material information; and (3) facilitating 
comparison of investment opportunities by mandating uniform 
format and content.152 In the context of crypto, however, these 
benefits may be more apparent than real. 
Even if the special character of cryptoassets was not involved, 
there are general criticisms that have been leveled against the SEC’s 
 
 148. “Some companies are shunning U.S. investors altogether in order to avoid U.S. 
securities law, which generally focuses on where investors are from rather than where the 
company is based.” Anna Irrera & Michelle Price, Cryptocurrency issuers clean up, shun U.S. 
investors as SEC gets tough, REUTERS (Mar. 21, 2018), [https://perma.cc/D34G-DTMR]. 
“Executives at Estonia-based iOlite, Scotland-based CaskCoin, UK-based Celsius 
Network, and Auctus, told Reuters they were barring U.S. citizens to steer clear of the 
SEC.” Id. “Anyone who has recently participated in a cryptocurrency ICO or pre-ICO may 
have noticed how these offerings are, in theory not available to residents in the US. … To 
put this into perspective, the United States is quite strict when it comes to investment 
regulations.” JP Buntinx, Why Can’t US Citizens Participate in Cryptocurrency ICOs? THE 
MERKLE (June 29, 2017), [https://perma.cc/A4UW-EB7W]. 
 149. See supra note 118. 
 150. Although this article does not focus on the role of other agencies, it is probably 
worth mentioning that other agencies also regulate crypto in the U.S. The CFTC has been 
active in this space, sometimes overlapping with the anti-fraud authority of the SEC. See 
CFTC v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp.3d 213, 222 (E.D.N.Y. 2018). For a more detailed 
consideration of the role of the CFTC, see CAROL GOFORTH, REGULATION OF 
CRYPTOTRANSACTIONS Chapters 11 & 12 (West Academic, 2020). 
 151. See The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/answers/about-lawsshtml.html. 
 152. See generally Securities Disclosure: Background and Policy Issues, CONGRESSIONAL 
RESEARCH SERVICE (June 25, 2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IF11256.pdf. 
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insistence on disclosure.153 One of the most common complaints is the 
sheer expense of complying with these reporting obligations.154 Given 
the complexities of modern financial markets, the cost of preparing 
the required disclosures can easily outweigh any benefits gained by 
preparing standardized disclosures. As one commentator observed, 
“[t]he key SEC disclosure requirements have been substantially 
frozen even as banking and financial innovation have undergone 
epochal changes.”155 In reality, it is widely recognized that few 
investors read or even attempt to understand the disclosures that are 
provided.156 
The larger problem for offerings of cryptoassets, however, is that 
the required disclosures do not hit at the center of issues relevant to a 
potential crypto-investor’s interests. Under current rules, the focus of 
the mandated disclosures for “securities” offerings is on the issuer 
and its business.157 The required offering materials, whether in the 
form of a prospectus for a registered offering or offering circular for 
private offerings, emphasize the overall financial health of the 
issuer’s business, its management, sources of competition, and risks 
related to its operations and projections. 
These may have nothing to do with the primary risks for 
investors in tokens, with the general exception of tokenized 
securities158 (unless, for example, the tokens convey an interest in the 
issuer’s profits). Perhaps a concrete example will make this clearer. 
Consider a social media giant that is publicly held and worth (based 
on revenue and profits) more than $100 billion. It wants to issue a 
 
 153. “As disclosure requirements and related costs have generally increased over 
time, questions have arisen over whether disclosed information is readable and 
understandable to investors.” Id. at 2. 
 154. See Considering an IPO? The Costs of Going and Being Public May Surprise You, PwC 
1 (2012), https://www.deschenaux.com/general-informations/E_pwc-cost-of-ipo.pdf. 
This source suggests that a company might expect an average of $3.7 million of costs 
“directly attributable to their IPO,” plus another $2 million in one-time costs, and about 
$1.5 million in recurring costs associated with being public. Id. at 1 fig.1, 10. This is not an 
option for the faint of heart. See id. 
 155. Henry T. C. Hu, Disclosure Universes and Modes of Information: Banks, Innovation, 
and Divergent Regulatory Quests, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 565, 565–66 (2014). 
 156. Tom C.W. Lin, Reasonable Investor(s), 95 B.U. L. REV. 461, 461 (2015) (“Much of 
financial regulation is built on a convenient fiction. This fundamental discord has resulted 
in a modern financial marketplace of mismatched regulations and misplaced 
expectations--a precarious marketplace that has frustrated investors, regulators, and 
policymakers.”) 
 157. See Cybersecurity, supra note 4, at 447. 
 158. See infra notes 188-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of tokenized 
securities. 
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cryptocurrency that can be used to purchase goods and services 
through its social media platform. While the social media company 
plans to have its own wallet service available for users, a tokenholder 
can also elect to use third-party wallets and exchange services, and 
other users are free to accept the cryptoasset for whatever purposes 
they deem appropriate. In this kind of situation, the ultimate success 
of the coin has very little to do with the historical value and operation 
of the company that is issuing it.159 Nonetheless, the current regime 
would require massive disclosures about the social media company’s 
owners, its business and operations, even if those are fundamentally 
unrelated to the new cryptoasset. Traditional investors in the issuer, 
whether they are buying debt or equity interests, are likely to be very 
concerned about this kind of information. Someone considering the 
new crypto is almost certain to have entirely different concerns and 
questions. To the extent that the SEC insists that crypto is a security 
and must fit into existing regulatory structures, it is unfortunate that 
the securities regulations focus only on the informational needs of 
traditional investors. 
To understand the interests of crypto-investors, it is important to 
consider the nature of the cryptoassets being acquired. In some cases, 
a cryptoasset may so closely resemble a traditional security that the 
interests of an owner will align with interests of persons who have 
purchased conventional debt or equity securities. The reality is that 
some forms of crypto will essentially be tokenized securities.160 In 
other words, by utilizing smart contracts hosted on a blockchain, an 
issuer might choose to issue cryptotokens designed to mirror either 
traditional equity or debt interests.161 Under this approach, the tokens 
 
 159. The resemblance of this hypothetical asset to Facebook’s originally planned Libra 
token is superficial. First, Libra was not being issued by Facebook; it was to be created and 
overseen by the Libra Association, which is a Swiss organization of which Facebook was 
only one of numerous founding members. Second, Facebook planned to use a subsidiary, 
Calibra, to act as the wallet service for the new coin. For various reasons, this separation 
of ownership is wise, but it would not have served the purposes of the hypothetical. See 
An Introduction to Libra, LIBRA (Sept. 20, 2019, 11:37 AM), [https://perma.cc/DJ6Z-7VQV]. 
See also Nick Statt, Facebook Confirms it will Launch a Cryptocurrency Called Libra in 2020, 
THE VERGE (June 18, 2019), [https://perma.cc/7JKH-H9J6]; Josh Constine, Highlights from 
Facebook’s Libra Senate Hearing, TECHCRUNCH (June 2019), [https://perma.cc/XR69-
YE4G]. 
 160. William Restis, tZERO’s Security Token Offering (STO) Unpacked, RESTISLAW 
(Ap. 4, 2018), [https://perma.cc/P5LT-ZT3C]. 
 161. Note that not every reference to a “security token” in public and academic 
commentary about crypto means a cryptoasset that resembles traditional debt or equity. 
Some commentators use “security token” to refer to any token that is regulated as a 
security, regardless of its functional characteristics. Pierre Villenave, Understanding the 
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might convey voting rights, a right to share in profits or appreciation, 
or a right to interest and principal repayments. For this narrow class 
of cryptoasset, it may indeed make sense to impose disclosure 
obligations that mirror the kinds of information that must be 
provided to potential purchasers of conventional debt and equity 
interests. 
This is not merely a theoretical possibility. In 2018, Overstock’s 
portfolio company tZero issued a token specifically designed to 
resemble preferred stock.162 One description of the offering was that 
it involved “an ‘exempt’ offering of preferred stock to accredited and 
non-U.S. investors . . . issued as an ERC-20 compatible token.”163 For 
this kind of crypto offering, traditional disclosure obligations may 
work as well as they do for other investors. 
However, most tokens are not being structured to operate in this 
manner. Either they are structured as cryptocurrencies (designed to 
replace government-backed currency),164 or they are designed with 
 
Regulatory Framework of Security Tokens, MEDIUM (Aug. 1, 2018), 
https://medium.com/lgogroup/understanding-the-regulatory-framework-of-security-
tokens-9b231118cab4 (stating that “[i]n the present state and given the SEC comments, it 
seems that most tokens issued through ICO’s will [be] qualified as a security.”) The 
BitcoinWiki also uses this definition. See Token, BITCOINWIKI (Oct. 22, 2018, 2:33 PM), 
[https://perma.cc/EPT4-T7PN]. 
 162. Alex Lielacher, ICO Tokens 101: Understanding Token Types, BITCOIN MARKET 
JOURNAL (Nov. 21, 2017), [https://perma.cc/5CNF-ZFJG] (suggesting that new tokens 
from tZero, a portfolio company of Overstock, Inc., would fit this categorization.). 
 163. Restis, supra note 160. 
 164. “Cryptocurrency” is also a word that is not used consistently. While it has been 
widely used, its meaning must be ascertained from the context in which it is employed. 
Often, “cryptocurrency” is used to describe both coins and tokens, regardless of how they 
are intended to function. One source, for example, says that “cryptocurrency” is generally 
understood as covering the realm of exchangeable value coins and tokens. See Aziz Bin 
Zainuddin, Coins, Tokens & Altcoins: What’s the Difference?, MASTERTHECRYPTO (Apr. 11, 
2019, 8:22 AM), [https://perma.cc/M4RA-CQHP] (“. . . [A]ll coins and tokens are 
regarded as cryptocurrencies, even if most of the coins do not function as a currency or 
medium of exchange.”). This same source suggest that “cryptocurrency” is a misnomer, 
since many coins and tokens that followed Bitcoin do not possess the traditional 
characteristics of currency such as being a unit of account, a store of value, and a medium 
of exchange. Id.  Coinmarketcap, a website that tracks what it calls cryptocurrency 
capitalization, divides cryptocurrencies into coins and tokens. See Today’s Cryptocurrency 
Prices by Market Cap, COINMARKETCAP, https://coinmarketcap.com. Some sources 
disagree with this taxonomy and instead limit “cryptocurrency” to the world of coins, 
using the term “cryptotoken” to refer to tokens. See Bin Zainuddin, supra this note. Tokens 
often have functions other than serving as a substitute for traditional currencies, which is 
why some commentators object to them being classified as cryptocurrencies. Some early 
commentators also appear to have assumed that “coin” meant something that was like a 
currency, while token must have been intended to have a different meaning. In still other 
contexts, the word “cryptocurrency” is used to describe all cryptoassets that are designed 
and intended to function as replacements for traditional currency. In this case, the 
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functions other than replacing debt or equity investment (such as 
access to goods and services, enriching user experience, as an in-
application reward, or otherwise).165 Investors in these kinds of 
cryptoassets are likely to have concerns that differ considerably from 
those of conventional investors. 
For example, it is not likely to be important to a crypto-investor 
(excluding cases involving tokenized securities) to know who owns 
the outstanding shares of the issuer. The qualifications and 
management of the issuer may be similarly disconnected from the 
primary interests of a crypto-investor, unless their function is to work 
with the new cryptoasset. The financial history and business 
operations of the issuer may also be unrelated to the concerns of 
someone interested in a new cryptoasset, as will sources of 
competition faced by the issuer in a pre-existing line of business. 
What are the primary interests of someone contemplating an 
investment in crypto? First, it will be important for the coin or token 
to be described. What is it intended to do? How far along is it in 
development? How will it operate? How will it be issued? How many 
coins or tokens have been pre-mined or distributed, and for what 
consideration? Is there a cap on the total number of tokens to be 
created, and if so, what is it? Can the cap be changed? How disperse 
is the ownership of the cryptoasset?166 How many of the outstanding 
coins or tokens are owned by the issuer, the team creating the asset, 
or an affiliate of such person(s)? Who are the members of the token 
development team, and what are their qualifications? What will be 
the policies on hard forks? How are errors or weaknesses in the 
protocol to be addressed or remedied? Under what circumstances 
will transactions be reversed or stopped? What privacy protocols are 
in place, and are they mandatory or optional? Who will be working 
on promotion of the coin or token? Are there restrictions or 
limitations on resale? Are there existing exchanges that accept the 
asset? If not, will anyone be working on finding an exchange or 
trading platform that will include the coin or token among their 
interests? Even though these are issues likely to be the most relevant 
 
designation refers to the currency function of the cryptoasset, rather than describing a 
presumed technical difference between coins and tokens. See Cryptionary, supra note 23 at 
69. 
 165. For an explanation of some of these functions, see The Importance of Token Utility, 
Function & Purpose, THE COINIST, https://www.coinist.io/ico-importance-of-designing-
utility-function-purpose-into-coin/. 
 166. This is different from the equity ownership in the issuer. 
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for crypto investors, these are not the kind of disclosures that are 
specifically mandated for securities. 
It might be argued that because this information is “material,” it 
needs to be disclosed even under the existing requirements.167 
However, the securities laws do not mandate disclosure of everything 
that an issuer might know. That is part of the proposal that this 
Article makes: the SEC needs to devote resources to articulating the 
types of disclosures particularly germane to crypto offerings rather 
than having to litigate the preliminary question of whether the asset 
is a security at all. It is not enough for the SEC to argue that crypto is 
a security, and then expect that compliance with inapt disclosure 
requirements will adequately protect investors. Instead, the 
requirement simply halts innovation or drives it out of the country. 
When plaintiffs allege that the defendants violated the Securities 
Act by omitting information required to be included in the 
registration statement, courts employ two accepted methods of 
determining whether a duty exists for the offeror to disclose certain 
information. First, an offeror is duty-bound to disclose all material 
information required to be disclosed by statute. Second, an offeror 
has a duty to disclose any additional information required to make 
another statement, whether required or voluntarily made, not 
misleading.168 
In other words, liability exists when an issuer fails to include 
material information that is “required to be stated.”169 It is widely 
recognized by the federal courts that not everything known or 
knowable by an issuer must be disclosed simply because investors 
would regard it as important.170 Thus, under current rules some 
relevant risks may not be disclosed, while the company is forced to 
 
 167. This might be in accordance with the overall objectives of the federal securities 
laws, and the ‘33 Act in particular. “The primary goal of the 1933 Securities Act was simply 
to require securities issuers to disclose all material information necessary for investors to 
be able to make informed investment decisions on stocks.” The 1933 Securities Act - “The 
Truth in Securities Act,” CFI, 
https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/trading-investing/1933-
securities-act-truth-securities/. 
 168. ELGA A. GOODMAN ET. AL, Elements of a Section 11 claim—Omissions, materiality, 
and the duty to disclose, in 50A N.J. PRAC., BUSINESS LAW DESKBOOK § 30:54 (2018-2019 ED.) 
(footnotes omitted). A third option is also suggested by the authors of this practice note, 
but that option focuses on situations involving insider trading. 
 169. Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a). 
 170. J & R Marketing, SEP v. General Motors Corp., 549 F.3d 384, 384 (6th Cir. 2008); 
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 (1988); Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 639 (6th Cir. 
1993). 
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prepare and present irrelevant information that purports to be what 
investors need to know. 
In addition, even if the crypto-specific information is disclosed, 
it would be buried in a mountain of information that is not 
particularly relevant. This would substantially decrease the chance 
that the important information would be reasonably accessible while 
simultaneously increasing the expense of preparing the disclosure 
document. 
Moreover, if the law is read as requiring such disclosures, by 
failing to include any explanation of what kind of information is 
“material” in the context of a crypto distribution, the risk that an 
issuer could inadvertently omit relevant information later deemed 
important is substantially increased. Finally, by requiring disclosure 
of all material information, the securities laws appear to be placing an 
unreasonable burden on issuers. As described earlier in this Article,171 
even if it is possible to identify an issuer, that person is unlikely is 
unlikely to be in a good position to report on the kinds of information 
that might be deemed material, under the vague current standards. 
For example, one of the most significant considerations for 
persons contemplating an investment in crypto relates to market 
volatility. In most cases, however, that risk is not attributable to the 
developer or issuer of a cryptoasset.172 The issuer or developer of a 
cryptoasset is typically in no better position than investors to predict 
how the market will behave. In addition, some crypto investors 
actively seek to benefit from volatility,173 and the degree to which 
individual investors tolerate risk will also vary widely. These factors 
make it virtually impossible for an issuer to accurately warn every 
investor about the “problem” of volatility-based risks. 
 
 171. See supra Part II.C. 
 172. It is, of course, possible that a crypto developer could create a cryptoasset with 
the intention of manipulating its subsequent market price in order to benefit from ensuing 
volatility. A developer willing to do this, however, is unlikely to voluntarily disclose this 
intention regardless of the existence of a regulatory mandate to do so. The mandate would 
thus apply to developers and issuers attempting to act in good faith, leaving them with 
an obligation to predict the behavior of others, including those who might seek to increase 
price volatility. 
 173. As one source notes, volatility means that the crypto market “has the potential to 
generate massive amounts of return.” Aziz Bin Zainuddin, Crypto Volatility: Why Volatility 
is Important in the Cryptocurrency Market, MASTERTHECRYPTO, 
https://masterthecrypto.com/crypto-volatility-important-cryptocurrency-market/ 
(noting that investors face a “high risk of losing a significant amount of capital,” and 
warns that investors need to assess their ability and willingness to accept those risks 
before purchasing crypto.) 
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Another potential problem outside the issuer’s knowledge or 
control is the risk that the crypto will be lost because of a failure of 
cybersecurity.174 This is, in fact, one of the largest risks faced by 
purchasers. Despite the increases in cyber security practices and 
procedures, the rate of hacking of crypto exchanges and wallet 
services actually appears to be increasing.175 On the other hand, not 
only is the issuer unlikely to have any special knowledge about cyber 
security risks, the issuer does not necessarily have anything to do 
with selecting the exchange or wallet service upon which the 
purchaser ultimately relies.176 Requiring the issuer to explain and 
evaluate risks that are in the control of the purchaser than the issuer 
seems counterintuitive at best. 
In evaluating the scope of the SEC’s current approach, SEC 
Commission Hester Peirce, sometimes called the Crypto Mom 
because of her pro-crypto remarks in various venues,177 has 
complained about the agency’s failure to provide clear guidelines for 
crypto businesses.178 One of her more colorful complaints is that the 
 
 174. See Cybersecurity, supra note 4. 
 175. Can They Be Stopped?, COINTELEGRAPH (June 18, 2019), 
https://cointelegraph.com/news/round-up-of-crypto-exchanges-hack-so-far-in-2019-
how-can-it-be-stopped. See also Clare Baldwin, Bitcoin Worth $72 Million Stolen from 
Bitfinex Exchange in Hong Kong, REUTERS (Aug. 3, 2016, 1:30 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bitfinex-hackcd-hongkong/bitcoin-worth-72-
million-stolen-from-bitfinex-exchange-in-hong-kong-idUSKCN10E0KP; Olga Kharif, 
Record Crypto Heist Raises the Appeal of a New Type of Exchange, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 29, 2018, 
6:00 PM) [https://perma.cc/32R3-UL8A]. 
 176. In the case of an IEO, or Initial Exchange Offer, this might not hold true. In a more 
conventional ICO, a token development company or team generally sells its newly created 
tokens directly to investors (or sells the right to obtain tokens once they are fully 
functional). In an IEO, the development group sells its tokens through a crypto exchange 
platform. The exchange essentially acts as a broker, dealer, or underwriter for the 
distribution, and in this case, the actual creator of the crypto does have something to do 
with at least the initial exchange that will host the crypto. See generally Benjamin Vitaris, 
What Is an Initial Exchange Offering (IEO) and How It Differs From ICO? CRYPTOPOTATO 
(updated Ap. 29, 2019), https://cryptopotato.com/what-is-an-initial-exchange-offering-
ieo-and-how-it-differs-from-ico/; Brian Curran, What Is an IEO? Complete Guide to Initial 
Exchange Offerings, BLOCKONOMI (Ap. 5, 2019), https://blockonomi.com/what-is-an-ieo/. 
Note, however, that the mere fact that the issuer selects the initial exchange does not mean 
that the issuer is in a better position than anyone else to assess the probability of the 
exchange being hacked. There seems to be no reason why an issuer would willfully or 
intentionally select an exchange that lacks reasonable security precautions. 
 177. See Christine Kim, Crypto Mom’s Crusade: Inside the SEC, Hester Peirce Is Putting 
Up a Fight, COINDESK (Dec. 31, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/coindesks-most-
influential-2018-blockchain-hester-peirce. 
 178. See Ana Alexandre, SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce Concerned Crypto Industry 
Hindered by Regulatory Delays, COINTELEGRAPH (May 9, 2019), 
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SEC has engaged in a “Jackson Pollock approach” to regulation.179 
When this scattershot approach is applied to the kinds of disclosures 
that are required, with many requirements being relevant to only a 
small fraction of crypto offerings, it paints the picture of a regulatory 
approach that fails in the ultimate mission of the agency: the 
protection of the public and the markets. 
None of this should be taken as a blanket condemnation of the 
SEC’s efforts. The SEC’s vigilance in warning about fraudulent 
practices, investigating problematic issuers, and enforcing antifraud 
requirements are all commendable.180 Unfortunately, the value of 
these efforts does not justify the wasted assets in pursuing expensive 
litigation over what constitutes a security and whether legally 
required disclosures have been made (regardless of the value of such 
information to potential purchasers).181 
 





 179. Peirce Speech, supra note 18. This observation was made in the context of 
considering the multi-factored approach currently being taken by the SEC in evaluating 
whether a particular cryptoasset qualifies as a security. 
 180. A list of SEC investor warnings and alerts related to digital assets can be found 
by a search of “digital assets” on the SEC’s Investor.gov pages. See Investor.gov, U.S. 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
https://www.investor.gov/search?keys=digital%20assets. A list of enforcement actions 
by the SEC relating to ICOs (including those that do not involve fraud) can be accessed. 
See Cyber Enforcement Actions, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/cybersecurity-enforcement-actions (listing a few actions 
that allege only a failure to register the offering, but the vast majority of the SEC’s 
complaints also involve claims of fraud, non-disclosure, and/or manipulation.). 
 181. This is not the only inefficiency in the current system. Another problem, not 
highlighted in great detail in this Article, is the existence of overlapping concurrent 
jurisdiction as between the SEC and CFTC. The CFTC has extensive experience in 
regulating derivatives and derivative exchanges, and since it is possible to have crypto 
derivatives the involvement of that agency seems entirely appropriate. See Written 
Testimony of Chairman J. Christopher Giancarlo before the Senate Banking Committee, 
Washington, D.C., CFTC (Feb. 6, 2018), 
https://cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opagiancarlo37. On the other hand, it 
seems duplicative to have both the SEC and CFTC expend time and effort in overseeing 
fraud in the spot markets (where actual transactions in the underlying commodities take 
place). Unfortunately, “[u]ntil Congress clarifies the matter, the CFTC has concurrent 
authority, along with other state and federal administrative agencies, and civil and 
criminal courts, over dealings in virtual currency.” CFTC v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d 
213, 217 (E.D.N.Y.), adhered to on denial of reconsideration, 321 F. Supp. 3d 366 (E.D.N.Y. 
2018). 
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Other commentators have noted the disconnect between what 
the SEC is supposed to do and what its extensive disclosure 
requirements are actually accomplishing.182 Some have simply 
concluded that the SEC needs to add precision to its approach to 
crypto,183 while others have offered more detailed proposals. None of 
these proposals, however, fully address the shortcomings of the 
current system, or they introduce problems of their own. 
One commentator has suggested that the U.S. should move to a 
system that allows accredited institutional investors, and perhaps 
other wealthy investors with slightly reduced sophistication 
standards, to invest freely in cryptoassets.184 This approach would not 
impose mandatory affirmative disclosures and instead would impose 
liability only for fraud or other deceitful behaviors. Unfortunately, 
moving solely to this type of anti-fraud regime185 has some significant 
problems. First, it fails to recognize that some crypto is likely to take 
the form of tokenized securities that genuinely mirrors traditional 
debt or equity.186 In these cases, it seems appropriate to retain current 
disclosure obligations. Even for other kinds of crypto, while most 
current disclosures are unlikely to be helpful, a limited amount of 
information probably should be required.187 For example, 
information about the function, design, control, and pre-sale 
ownership of the particular cryptoasset would be relevant when an 
 
 182. See Shlomit Azgad-Tromer, Crypto Securities: On the Risks of Investments in 
Blockchain-Based Assets and The Dilemmas of Securities Regulation, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 69, 112–
30 (2018); Nathan J. Hochman, Policing the Wild West of Cryptocurrency Part II, L.A. LAW. 
26, 28 (Dec. 2018). 
 183. E.g., Allen Kogan, Not All Virtual Currencies Are Created Equal: Regulatory Guidance 
in the Aftermath of CFTC v. McDonnell, 8 Am. U. Bus. L. Rev. 199, 199 (2019). 
 184. See Azgad-Tromer, supra note 182 at 131. This does not address the problem of 
how to allow smaller investors to participate in crypto markets. Limiting them to 
secondary trading transactions where there are no minimum disclosures expected may 
make the system harder for them to navigate, although this proposal would certainly offer 
major relief to the entrepreneurs seeking to participate in the space. 
 185. Azgad-Tromer’s objections to the current disclosure regime start with the reality 
that the reason behind the current paradigm is the SEC’s desire “to remove the 
information asymmetry between investors and offerors so as to promote informed 
investment decisions.” See Azgad-Tromer, supra note 182 at 105. 
 186. Some commentators have suggested that this will be the next direction for crypto. 
See The Next Big Wave is Security Tokens or Tokenized Securities to Provide Liquidity, BITCOIN 
EXCHANGE GUIDE (Sept. 12, 2018), [https://perma.cc/5WER-H632]. However, as of the 
date of this article this has not yet materialized, possibly because of the uncertain 
regulatory regime. 
 187. While much of this may already appear somewhere in the whitepaper or 
investment information provided by the issuer or promoter of particular crypto-projects, 
there is a significant benefit to having consistent, uniform platforms for providing basic 
data. See Azgad-Tromer, supra note 182 at 107. 
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issuer releases tokenized securities, or when an issuer or other person 
in the business of promoting the asset seeks to sell “true” 
cryptocurrencies (i.e., cryptoassets specifically designed to serve as 
fiat currency substitutes). Other forms of crypto specifically marketed 
as speculative investments might also require specific disclosures in 
order to protect potential purchasers. 
In addition, this suggested approach would limit sales of crypto 
to wealthy, sophisticated investors, which seems antithetical to the 
democratic ideals of blockchain technology and is therefore likely to 
be objectionable to many within the crypto community.188 Finally, it 
is unlikely that legislators will have the political will to force the SEC 
to abandon its emphasis on disclosure,189 while a change to reviewing 
different kinds of disclosures might be more palatable. 
Another possibility that has been raised is to create a new 
regulatory agency to oversee cryptoassets in lieu of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission and other authorities.190 Admittedly, the 
current situation, which involves multiple federal and state 
authorities with concurrent and overlapping jurisdiction over 
cryptoassets, includes a substantial risk of over-regulation and 
unnecessary complexity.191 It is certainly possible that a new agency 
could be created to avoid the problems currently faced by the SEC. 
Similarly, a new agency could remedy the CFTC’s inability to 
 
 188. The SEC is logically more concerned about protecting the average citizen, or 
“main street investor.” The presumption is that persons who have sufficient expertise in 
investing or the wealth to hire professional advisors are less in need of the SEC’s 
protection and regulated disclosures. However, this approach means that sales designed 
to comply with an exemption by being limited to wealthy, well-educated persons excludes 
the average citizen. It is this which is antithetical to the original underpinnings of Bitcoin 
and blockchain technology. See Alex Tapscott, Blockchain Democracy: Government Of The 
People, By The People, For The People, FORBES (Aug. 16, 2016), [https://perma.cc/9CED-
PVF3] (“Blockchain is a vast, global distributed ledger or database running on millions of 
devices and open to anyone, where not just information but anything of value – money, 
but also titles, deeds, identities, even votes – can be moved, stored and managed securely 
and privately– and where trust can be established through mass collaboration and clever 
code rather than by powerful intermediaries like governments and banks.”). 
 189. This is a problem noted by other scholars. Azgad-Tromer, supra note 182 at 119 
(commenting on probable political opposition by the SEC and politically powerful stock 
exchanges). 
 190. See Hochman, supra note 182 at 31. Hochman argues, “[n]ow, it is time for 
Congress to create the CEC as the federal ‘crypro-sheriff’ to strike the right balance in 
reining in the Wild West of Cryptocurrency.” Id. at 31. 
 191. At the federal level, FinCEN, the CFTC, the SEC, and the IRS have authority over 
cryptoassets. This does not even include state authorities and other agencies, such as the 
FTC, that may have jurisdiction over limited aspects of crypto. See Carol Goforth, US Law: 
Crypto is Money, Property, a Commodity, and a Security, all at the Same Time, OXFORD BUS. L. 
BLOG (Dec. 7, 2018), [https://perma.cc/4ZNM-7WBM] [hereinafter US Law]. 
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regulate spot market transactions, and FinCEN’s “inability to impose 
uniform national regulation and enforcement of money series 
businesses currently subject to the myriad of state licensing 
regimes.”192 
Despite the superficial attractiveness of this alternative, it is not 
likely to be a realistic option. First, consider the current anti-
regulatory environment in which we operate.193 The myriad problems 
posed by the Covid-19 pandemic caused the Trump administration 
to further push its anti-regulatory agenda.194 In addition to the 
political obstacles, there are real world reasons to avoid this 
approach. The U.S. budget deficit is a bigger problem than crypto is 
likely to be in the foreseeable future.195 A new agency would have to 
 
 192. Hochman, supra note 182 at 31. 
 193. Jeff Cox, The anti-regulatory environment that Trump promised just got a big boost, 
CNBC (Nov. 19, 2017), [https://perma.cc/W8AQ-YECL] (commenting on President 
Donald Trump’s promises to create a less restrictive regulatory environment, particularly 
in banking). Obviously, the political regime  has changed, but opposition to what is widely 
seen as excessive regulation goes far beyond the Trump administration. See, e.g., Over-
regulated America, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 18, 2012), [https://perma.cc/G8F9-Z25M]. This 
statement seems to encapsulate widely held views about the value of regulation. H. 
Beales, et al., “Government Regulation: The Good, The Bad, & The Ugly”, REGULATORY 
TRANSPARENCY PROJECT OF THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY (June 12, 2017), 
https://regproject.org/wp-content/uploads/RTP-Regulatory-Process-Working-Group-
Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2K3-MYYS] (“The American free enterprise system has 
been one of the greatest engines for prosperity and liberty in history, and has the potential 
to deliver a promising future for the United States and the world. . . . Yet, the United States 
faces growing challenges in an increasingly competitive global economy. Recent decades 
have seen a decline in economic growth and innovation, and one important cause is 
poorly-designed government policies. Large swaths of the American economy are 
distorted by government mandates and incentives, and the vast majority of binding 
“laws” are not enacted by our elected representatives in Congress, but are promulgated 
by agencies as regulations.”) 
 194. See generally Jeff Stein & Robert Costa, White House readies push to slash regulations 
as major part of its coronavirus economic recovery plan, THE WASHINGTON POST (Ap. 21, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/04/21/white-house-coronavirus-
regulations/. The anti-regulatory approach was initiated early in President Trump’s term 
when he signed an executive order requiring agencies to identify at least two regulations 
that could be targeted every time a new regulation is proposed. Nolan D. McCaskill & 
Matthew Nussbaum, Trump signs executive order requiring that for every one new regulation, 
two must be revoked, POLITICO (Jan. 1, 2017), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/01/trump-signs-executive-order-requiring-that-
for-every-one-new-regulation-two-must-be-revoked-234365. See Richard L. Revesz, 
Congress and the Executive: Challenging the Anti-Regulatory Narrative, 2018 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
795, 795 (2018) (noting the in midst of the current anti-regulatory zealousness, cost-benefit 
analysis of various regulations being repealed has been over-looked). 
 195. For a simplified explanation of the problems posed by the federal deficit, see 
Heather Long, Why America’s return to $1 trillion deficits is a big problem for you, WASH. POST 
(Ap. 9, 2018), [https://perma.cc/4EAV-J3BL]. This assessment was written before the 
massive increases in our national debt that have occurred since that date. During 2019, the 
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be authorized, housed, staffed, and provided with sufficient 
resources to fulfill its mandate. It would need to be able to investigate 
and enforce crypto-focused requirements, presumably taking over 
issues currently regulated by the SEC and CFTC, as well as possibly 
implicating FinCEN’s jurisdiction. In addition, each of these agencies 
is likely to object to having their jurisdiction reduced simply in order 
to create a new agency that will have to be created, funded, staffed, 
and generally brought up to speed (with concomitant delays and 
expense). Finally, the success of a new agency would depend entirely 
on the mandate that it was handed.196 If it, too, chooses or is directed 
to start from the current disclosure paradigm, focusing on 
information about the business of the issuer or creator of a 
cryptoasset, it will suffer from many of the same problems as the 
existing system. 
Other suggestions have focused on modifying the existing 
paradigm affecting cryptoassets in more limited ways. One such 
approach would be to reconfigure the Howey test. Probably the 
simplest option would be for courts to narrowly construe Howey so 
as to exclude most “utility tokens” from its reach.197 This approach 
has been advocated by SAFT proponents for some time,198 but the SEC 
seems disinclined to follow it.199 The most recent judicial 
 
national debt swelled by $1.1 trillion to exceed $23 trillion. The Treasury Department 
projected a budget deficit of nearly $400 billion for the first four months of fiscal 2020, a 
25% gain over the prior year. 
Jeff Cox, US deficit surges 25% in fiscal 2020 and is $1.1 trillion over the past year, CNBC (Feb 
12, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/12/us-deficit-swells-25percent-in-fiscal-
2020-up-1point1-trillion-over-past-year.html. These numbers do not take into account the 
additional $2 trillion coronavirus stimulus bailout passed in March 2020. Emily Cochrane 
& Nicholas Fandos, Senate Approves $2 Trillion Stimulus After Bipartisan Deal, THE N.Y. 
TIMES (March 25, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/25/us/politics/coronavirus-senate-deal.html. 
 196. In fact, adding another agency to the mix is only likely to complicate matters. 
Current agencies are unlikely to voluntarily cede their authority, meaning that a new 
agency is likely to have to deal with rules and requirements overseen by FinCEN (the 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network), the CFTC (the Commodities Futures Trading 
Commission), the SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission), and the IRS (Internal 
Revenue Service), unless the new agency is given exclusive authority. See US Law, supra 
note 191. It would, of course, also need preemptive authority to ameliorate the impact of 
diverse regulations at the state level as well. 
 197. Nate Crosser, Initial Coin Offerings As Investment Contracts: Are Blockchain Utility 
Tokens Securities?, 67 U. KAN. L. REV. 379, 409 (2018). 
 198. See generally Batiz-Benet, Clayburgh, & Santori, supra note 116 (giving a brief 
description of SAFTs). 
 199. See supra Part II.B., discussing the Kik and Telegram litigation in which the SEC 
strongly asserted its position that a SAFT offering for utility tokens were securities. The 
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pronouncement also suggests that this is unlikely to prevail in the 
courts under current rules.200 
A similar, but more complicated, suggestion would require the 
courts to adopt some specific requirements in order for a cryptoasset 
to be classified as a security under Howey.201 This proposal, advanced 
by Professors M. Todd Henderson and Max Raskin in 2019, suggests 
the use of two specific tests, one affecting the “efforts of others” 
prong, and the other relating to the “expectation of profits” prong.202 
Under the first prong, a cryptoasset would be excluded from the 
definition of a security if it is sufficiently decentralized because there 
would then be no “other” party to satisfy the Howey requirement that 
a purchaser be relying on the “essential efforts” of others.203 This is 
not a huge leap from the analysis advocated by the SEC or employed 
by most courts, but unless the Supreme Court adopts this approach, 
the SEC will continue to focus resources on litigating the issue. 
The second element would prevent an asset from being classified 
as a security so long as the promoters are making good faith efforts 
to develop a product reasonably intended to have functionality for 
some users beyond a profits interest.204 This would require a 
significant shift in focus for the SEC, since it deviates from the notion 
that a token “in development” generally involves reliance on the 
efforts of the promoter or associated persons for a return on the 
investment.205 Moreover, it is a far different thing to say that an asset 
should not be considered a security so long as some purchasers may 
be acquiring the asset for its functionality rather than asking whether 
it is foreseeable that some purchasers will be making a speculative 
investment. Since the SEC’s objective is to protect investors, and the 
 
utility of the Kin token and the Grams at issue in those two cases related to the underlying 
Kik and Telegram social media platforms. 
 200. Id. 
 201. M. Todd Henderson & Max Raskin, A Regulatory Classification of Digital Assets: 
Toward an Operational Howey Test for Cryptocurrencies, ICOs, and Other Digital Assets, 2019 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 443, 491 (2019). For a reminder about the elements of the conventional 
Howey test, see supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text. 
 202. Id. This article labels the first the “Bahamas test,” which is explained as asking 
whether the sudden departure of the sellers to someplace like the Bahamas for a perpetual 
retirement would affect the value of the asset. Id. at 461. The second is referred to as the 
“Substantial Steps Test.” Id. at 478. This test essentially says that the asset will not be a 
security if the promoters are “taking good faith, substantial steps towards completion of 
a product that they believe will have use to some users of the token beyond resale value 
or economic income.” Id. at 483. 
 203. Id. at 460-61. 
 204. Id. at 483. 
 205. See Framework, supra note 6 at 3-4. 
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agency shows no indication that it is willing to find a pre-functional 
interest to be anything other than a security,206 this is unlikely to be a 
practical suggestion. 
Other more complicated options have also been advanced. One 
commentator suggested relying on token protocols to establish terms 
that could be codified into a new exemption from registration.207 
Advocates of this suggestion proposed that regulators and Ethereum, 
as the platform that originally hosted the large majority of tokens and 
from which most ICOs were launched, jointly agree on best practices 
which, if adopted as part of the computer coding for new tokens, 
would support exempting the new assets from existing registration 
requirements.208 Even assuming such agreement is possible, it is not 
certain that Ethereum will continue to be the primary platform for 
hosting tokens and ICO; certainly other options now exist.209 It is also 
likely that it would be difficult for regulators to monitor coding for 
new assets and ensure that work-arounds were not also embedded 
into the software.210 Importantly, the SEC shows no indication that it 
is even willing to consider this approach. 
Many other suggestions, some very narrow and some quite 
broad, have also been advance. One particularly narrow alternative 
would simply exclude tokens issued by a DAO from the ambit of the 
 
 206. Even the proponents of the SAFT generally concur that the initial pre-functional 
stage where purchasers are asked to buy contractual rights to purchase utility tokens 
when issued involves the sale of a security. See generally supra note 116 (giving a brief 
discussion of the SAFT process). 
 207. Randolph A. Robinson II, The New Digital Wild West: Regulating the Explosion of 
Initial Coin Offerings, 85 TENN. L. REV. 897, 957 (2018). 
 208. Id. at 956. The author posits that “[b]ecause the majority of ICOs are currently 
launched on the Ethereum platform the SEC should encourage and work with Ethereum 
developers to integrate legal principles directly into the code that governs the platform.” 
Id. 
 209. See Where to Issue ICO Tokens: Platforms Review, COINTELEGRAPH, 
https://cointelegraph.com/ico-101/where-to-issue-ico-tokens-platforms-review (noting 
a number of issues with Ethereum as a platform, as well as identifying a number of 
alternatives, including Eos, Tezos, Waves, NEO, NEM, and Stellar). 
 210. Current review of textual information in the very-familiar registration statement 
already takes the SEC weeks or months. See Steven Skolnicka & Alan Wovsanikera, The 
Jobs Act: Improving Access To Capital Markets For Smaller Businesses in RECENT 
DEVELOPMENTS IN SECURITIES LAW 1, 3 (ed. 2016); Stuart R. Cohn, The Impact of Securities 
Laws on Developing Companies: Would the Wright Brothers Have Gotten Off the Ground?, 3 J. 
SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 315, 366 n.104 (1999) (noting that first time filers can generally 
expect “weeks” of review of their registration statement). There is no way to predict how 
long it might take the SEC to review disclosures embedded in computer code. 
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securities laws.211 This would only address a small number of 
distributions as most tokens would not fit within that categorization. 
At the other end of the spectrum, another approach would 
completely remove crypto from the reach of the securities laws by 
treating it as virtual currency.212 This approach seems overly broad, 
as the SEC does have an extremely reasonable interest and expertise 
in the case of tokenized securities cast as cryptoassets and certainly 
has a legitimate concern about fraud in the broader crypto setting. 
Other advocates for “clarity” in the SEC’s approach make the case 
that it is desirable to readily distinguish between interests that are 
securities and those that are not,213 but fail to consider that there may 
be benefits to applying the anti-fraud requirements even if would 
make little sense to apply existing registration requirements. 
One final proposal merits discussion, and that is one advanced 
by SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce. On February 6, 2020, 
Commissioner Peirce unveiled a proposal that in her words would 
“fill the gap between regulation and decentralization.”214 At the time 
of her original proposal, Commissioner Peirce was very careful to 
remind everyone that the opinions she expressed were her own and 
that the proposal was “not fully formed in my own mind and may 
not reflect my own opinions in the months to come.”215 Her proposal 
started with the belief that the SEC’s current approach resulted in 
“well-intentioned” persons “struggling to find a way both to comply 
with the law and accomplish their laudable objectives.”216 As a result, 
Commissioner Peirce proposed a safe harbor for network developers 
in which they would have three years in which to “facilitate 
participation in and the development of a functional or decentralized 
network” that would not be within the ambit of the securities laws 
presumably because market forces rather than the efforts of any 
identifiable persons would dictate pricing.217 
 
 211. Tiffany L. Minks, Ethereum and the Sec: Why Most Distributed Autonomous 
Organizations Are Subject to the Registration Requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 and A 
Proposal for New Regulation, 5 TEX. A&M L. REV. 405, 405 (2018). 
 212. See Susan Alkadri, Defining and Regulating Cryptocurrency: Fake Internet Money or 
Legitimate Medium of Exchange?, DUKE L. & TECH. REV., 71, 77 (2018). 
 213. See Justin Henning, The Howey Test: Are Crypto-Assets Investment Contracts?, 27 U. 
MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 51, 52 (2018) (advocating for clarification in the definition). 
 214. Hester M. Peirce, Running on Empty: A Proposal to Fill the Gap Between Regulation 
and Decentralization, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Feb. 6, 2020), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/peirce-remarks-blockress-2020-02-06. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Peirce, Empty, supra note 214. 
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The conditions for the proposed safe harbor include the 
following: (1) the development team must intend to reach network 
maturity (defined as either decentralization or token functionality) 
within three years; (2) key information would need to be publicly 
disclosed;218 (3) the token would need to be sold for the purpose of 
facilitating access to, participation on, or development of the 
network;219 (4) there must be reasonable efforts to create liquidity for 
users; and (5) the developers would need to notify the SEC that it is 
relying on the safe harbor.220 
While this proposal generated considerable comment among 
crypto-enthusiasts, it has not gained any traction at the SEC.221 It has 
been said that “the commission has little motivation and limited time 
to devote to helping the crypto industry given that the industry has 
been so problematic, having been an outsized thorn in their side for 
the last few years . . ..”222 In addition, this approach still leaves the 
SEC in the position of having to argue that crypto is a security under 
the existing statutory definition,223 and it cannot remove problems 
caused by overlapping authority with the CFTC.224 
 
V. A DIFFERENT APPROACH 
 
Rather than suggesting that the courts and the SEC modify the 
Howey test to avoid classifying some forms of crypto as securities, or 
 
 218. The proposal discusses the kind of information that would need to be disclosed, 
and it focuses on the source code and transaction history as being of “primary 
importance.” Id. In reality, very few individuals would be capable of understanding the 
source code or the significance of many provisions included in the programming. 
However, the proposal would also require disclosure of information that is of more 
obvious importance to potential purchasers, including information about the launch and 
supply process, the total number of authorized tokens, the release schedule, how tokens 
are generated or mined, the process for burning tokens, the transaction validation process, 
the consensus mechanism and governance mechanisms for implementing changes to the 
network. Id. Information about the plan of development and intended functionality would 
also be needed. Id. 
 219. Commissioner Peirce explains that this element is intended to prevent “equity or 
debt securities masquerading as tokens” from relying on this safe harbor. Id. 
 220. Id. 
 221. See, i.e., Ben Jessel, Can Hester Peirce’s Safe Harbor Proposal Save Cryptocurrency? 
Experts Weigh In, FORBES (Apr. 1, 2020), [https://perma.cc/XL6E-X2JB] (“While the 
proposal has attracted a lot of interest and commentary it has little chance of making it 
into law, for a multitude of reasons.”). 
 222. Id. 
 223. See supra Part II.B. for a consideration of two of the latest cases where this has 
been (and as of this writing, for one of those cases still is) an issue. 
 224. See supra note 181 for a brief explanation of this issue. 
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that the SEC alone should be counted on to remedy the problems 
created by the current regime, this Article suggests that almost all225 
of such assets should be included within the ambit of the federal 
securities laws. This would require legislative intervention, and 
ideally the amendments would also provide the SEC with exclusive 
and preemptive jurisdiction over the new asset class while 
incorporating a legislative mandate that the SEC adopt appropriate 
exemptions premised on limited disclosure obligations. This 
suggestion is developed more fully in the next section of this Article. 
Both the SEC and courts are currently wed to the Howey 
investment contract analysis in considering which cryptoassets are 
securities. As described above, this leads to extensive and expensive 
delays and uncertainties, and it has spawned a wide range of 
suggestions (often at odds with each other) about how the test might 
be modified. In reality, the Howey test is much like forcing 
Cinderella’s slipper onto the feet of her stepsisters; it does not fit well, 
and it is painful.226 The solution is not to try and lop off toes and heels, 
but to find a different choice of footwear. 
In order to move away from Howey, however, a number of things 
must happen. The first four steps all take Congressional action. First, 
Congress should amend the definition of security in the federal 
securities laws to explicitly recognize cryptoassets as a new class of 
security. Second, Congress should give the SEC exclusive authority 
over this asset class, although the CFTC would retain jurisdiction 
over derivatives of such assets and the exchanges upon which such 
derivatives are traded. Third, Congress should give the SEC 
preemptive authority in order to ensure that conflicting state 
regulations will not overly complicate the regulatory response. 
Fourth, the SEC should be given explicit authority and direction to 
create exemptions for this new class of security. In particular, the SEC 
should be directed to create an exemption from registration for crypto 
 
 225. Under this definition, cryptoassets not convertible, directly or indirectly, into fiat 
currency would not be securities and neither would any such interest that cannot 
reasonably be foreseen to be of interest as a speculative investment. If “cryptoasset” was 
added to the laundry list of things that count as a security in section 2 of the ‘33 Act, the 
phrase “unless the context otherwise requires” might be sufficient to exclude those kinds 
of interests from regulation as securities. Defining cryptoasset would, of course, be 
preferable in order to avoid any potential confusion. 
 226. Jeremy Allaire, CEO and co-founder of Goldman Sachs-backed crypto finance 
company Circle, has opined that the lack of clarity from the SEC over how crypto should 
be defined is “[t]he biggest and most immediate regulatory hurdle” facing crypto today. 
Marie Huillet, Circle CEO Says More Regulatory Clarity From US SEC Will Help Unlock 
Crypto Markets, COINTELEGRAPH (Jan. 11, 2019) [https://perma.cc/6L3V-WLRW]. 
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offerings that disclose meaningful information about the token 
project itself, rather than about the issuer. Obviously, the SEC would 
then have to promulgate these exemptions. The next sections of this 
Article examine each of these steps in turn. 
 
A. A NEW DEFINITION OF SECURITY 
 
As mentioned, the first step requires legislative intervention to 
amend the federal securities laws227 to specifically include all 
cryptoassets that are convertible, directly or indirectly, into fiat 
currency228 so long as it is reasonably foreseeable that there is a 
substantial likelihood229 that they will be sold for investment rather 
than consumptive purposes.230 
 
 227. For example, section 2 of the Securities Act of 1933 and section 3 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 would both need to be amended to add a new category of interests 
to the current definition of “security.” 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(b) & 78(c), respectively. Other 
securities laws would need similar updates. The list of items defined as a security could 
simply be amended to add “cryptoassets,” and then the specific limits on the kinds of 
assets that qualify could be included in a definition of the word “cryptoasset.” 
 228. Note that Bitcoin and Ether would both be securities under this approach. 
Because a decentralized cryptoasset that is widely dispersed is not controlled by any 
person or associated group of persons, the SEC should be expected to develop an 
exemption for such assets. Both Bitcoin and Ether have been held not to fit under the 
current regime, and statements have been made to the effect that there is little to be gained 
by trying to impose securities registration requirements on them. See supra note 76 and 
accompanying text. There is therefore little reason to suspect that the commission would 
attempt to require registration or an exemption under an amended approach. This would, 
however, leave in place the anti-fraud provisions for persons who are engaged in selling 
these assets, which seems quite appropriate. 
 229. Securities lawyers may recognize part of this language. In considering the 
question of materiality in the context of allegedly defective proxy disclosures, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has held that “[a]n omitted fact is material if there is a substantial 
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to 
vote.” TSC Indus., v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). This formulation threaded 
the needle between the overly lenient test of information that “might” be important and 
the excessively restrictive test of information that “would” be important. The same 
approach was adopted in the context of materiality in securities fraud cases in Basic Inc. 
v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988). 
 230. Claims are still being made that specific tokens are not securities at all. See 
Stephen Brown, The Cryptocurrency World Deliberates On The Security Status Of Ripple’s 
XRP, ZYCRYPTO (Dec. 12, 2018) [https://perma.cc/A7RP-KJ4Z]. Further muddying 
already opaque waters, Penn State Law visiting Assistant Professor Michael O’Connor 
has argued that the SEC is “wrong” in attempting to regulate crypto exchanges. Tom 
Rodgers, Analysis: SEC Securities Definition of Crypto ‘Unlawful’, says Research, CRYPTO 
NEWS REVIEW (Dec. 21, 2018) [https://perma.cc/84JT-P8U4]. It would greatly clarify 
things to know that crypto is a security (just one with convenient and workable 
exemptions from the registration requirement). 
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Adding a new class of securities would resolve some of the 
problems that are currently plaguing entrepreneurs and regulators 
alike. It would no longer be necessary to apply the Howey test, 
avoiding continued uncertainty and complexity.231 A straightforward 
definition avoids the confusion created by a test that says some forms 
of crypto may be securities at one time but at some future time may 
no longer be securities, or even more confusingly, they may not be 
securities initially but later might become subject to securities laws.232 
This would simultaneously allow the SEC to shift resources to more 
productive areas, such as considering disclosures that should apply 
to the new class of interests, while providing certainty for 
entrepreneurs. In addition, it would align the SEC’s approach more 
closely with the positions taken by other countries, which tend to 
refer to crypto as a cryptoasset rather than a digital asset.233 
The requirement that the cryptoasset be convertible is consistent 
with the approaches taken by the SEC, CFTC and FinCEN, all of 
which recognize that a cryptoasset, digital asset, or virtual currency 
that cannot be converted into conventional currency, either directly 
or indirectly, and therefore cannot substitute for it, requires little in 
 
 231. To demonstrate the lack of clarity and consistency in the SEC’s definitional 
approach to when cryptoassets are securities, see supra Part II.A. 
 232. A new framework for evaluating whether “digital assets” are securities was 
announced by the SEC on April 3, 2019. See Framework, supra note 6. The framework 
includes specific warnings that various conditions may make it necessary to reevaluate 
“whether a digital asset previously sold as a security” might have become a security at 
the time of later offers or sales. Id. at 5, 8. 
 233. As noted earlier, authorities in other countries tend to have adopted 
“cryptoasset” as the appropriate label by which to refer to such assets. For example, in the 
E.U., the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), published advice to 
European institutions in January 2019, acknowledging that cryptoassets with certain 
characteristics are financial instruments and should be supervised as such, although this 
requires action by individual countries in order to be effective. ESMA, Crypto-Assets Need 
Common EU-Wide Approach to Ensure Investor Protection (Jan. 9, 2019) [https://perma.cc/
45CM-GHYE]. U.K. officials have also adopted this terminology. See Mike Orcutt, 
Cryptocurrency is terrible as money but “crypto-assets” are for real, says Bank of England’s chief, 
MIT TECH. REV. (Mar. 2, 2018) [https://perma.cc/CB4R-4MS5] (noting the Bank of 
England Governor’s comments on the need for a measured response to crypto-assets). 
Other international organizations use “cryptoassets” in their work as well. I.e., FSB, FSB 
reports on work underway to address crypto-asset risks (May 31, 2019), https://www.fsb.org/
2019/05/fsb-reports-on-work-underway-to-address-crypto-asset-risks/. This report was 
prepared for the G20 meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, June 8–
9, 2019. A copy of the report can be found at FSB, Crypto-assets—Work underway, regulatory 
approaches and potential gaps (May 31, 2019), https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/
P310519.pdf. See also FSB, Crypto-assets—Report to the G20 on Work by the FSB and Standard-
Setting Bodies, 1 (July 16, 2018) [https://perma.cc/E3E5-6NFG]. Cf. Framework, supra note 
6. 
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the way of regulation.234 Finally, any asset that has no investment 
value does not carry the kind of risks that the SEC generally regulates. 
It would further neither the goals of protecting capital markets nor 
mainstream investors to impose existing requirements on crypto if 
the assets have no speculative value. 
Admittedly, a change in policy requiring that all cryptoassets be 
classified and treated as securities is not likely to be universally 
welcomed by crypto-entrepreneurs, but their concerns might be 
mitigated by adoption of exemptions geared specifically toward 
cryptoassets. The reality is that there are too many bad actors in the 
crypto space and the costs associated with involvement of criminal 
enterprises interested in bilking the investing public are too 
significant for crypto to be unregulated.235 The current system, where 
multiple regulatory agencies claim authority and where the new 
assets are forced into existing rules and structures236 is clearly less 
desirable than a single, more tailored approach. 
 
B. EXCLUSIVITY OF JURISDICTION AND THE CFTC’S ROLE 
 
Under the current regime, the SEC and CFTC have concurrent 
jurisdiction over various aspects of cryptoassets.237 This is a result of 
the SEC’s interpretation of the Howey investment contract test,238 and 
 
 234. See generally SEC, Public Statement, Leaders of CFTC, FinCEN, and SEC Issue Joint 
Statement on Activities Involving Digital Assets (Oct. 11, 2019) [https://perma.cc/3S3Q-
9AF3]. 
 235. See supra note 10. 
 236. As noted earlier at note 191, there are multiple federal and state authorities that 
currently have jurisdiction over cryptoassets. At the federal level, the overlap between the 
SEC and CFTC jurisdiction is probably the most problematic. See supra note 181 for an 
explanation of the overlap. This point is also made in the next section of this Article. 
 237. “The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (“CFTC”) have both claimed ability to regulate this space, with the 
SEC deeming virtual currencies to be securities by reason that they are investment 
contracts and the CFTC looking to classify them as commodities.” Victor N.A. Metallo, 
Are They Commodities or Securities? Virtual Currency Markets – Congress Must Create A New 
Regulatory Entity, 8 WAKE FOREST L. REV. ONLINE 44 (Sept. 30, 2018). See also T. Gorman, 
Blockchain, Virtual Currencies and the Regulators, DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP (Jan. 11, 2018), 
https://www.secactions.com/blockchain-virtual-currencies-and-the-regulators/. “As 
the CFTC recently admitted, U.S. law does not provide for ‘direct comprehensive U.S. 
regulation of virtual currencies. To the contrary a multi-regulatory approach is being 
used.’”). 
 238. See supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text. 
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the extremely broad definition of commodity in the Commodity 
Exchange Act (CEA).239 
In 2014, the CFTC first declared virtual currencies to be a 
“commodity” subject to its authority under the CEA,240 and on 
September 17, 2015, the CFTC issued its first administrative order 
confirming the position that Bitcoin and other virtual currencies were 
commodities under the CEA.241 In addition to various enforcement 
actions involving derivatives,242 the CFTC has also claimed authority 
to regulate fraud in the crypto spot markets.243 Originally, it claimed 
such authority for fraud in connection with Bitcoin trades.244 This 
makes sense under the current statutes because Bitcoin is an asset in 
which futures are traded. However, the CFTC has also initiated anti-
 
 239. Section 1(a)(9) of the Act defines “commodity” to include, among other things, 
“all services, rights, and interests in which contracts for future delivery are presently or in 
the future dealt in.” 7 U.S.C. § 1(a)(9). Not surprisingly, this has been broadly construed 
to cover “virtual currencies,” which the CFTC has defined to include any “digital 
representation of value that functions as a medium of exchange, a unit of account, and/or 
a store of value.” CFTC, An Introduction to Virtual Currency [https://perma.cc/4CS9-
2MJ9]. For a more complete description of the CFTC’s approach to crypto (which it calls 
virtual currencies), see LabCFTC, A CFTC Primer on Virtual Currencies (Oct. 17, 2017) 
[https://perma.cc/Y8YE-E2CE] (hereinafter Primer). 
 240. CFTC, Testimony of CFTC Chairman Timothy Massad before the U.S. Senate Committee 
on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry (Dec. 10, 2014), 
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opamassad-6). 
 241. CFTC, CFTC Orders Bitcoin Options Trading Platform Operator and its CEO to Cease 
Illegally Offering Bitcoin Options and to Cease Operating a Facility for Trading or Processing of 
Swaps without Registering, REL. NO. 7231-15 (Sept. 17, 2015), 
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7231-15. For additional details 
about this action, see Conrad Bahlke, Recent Developments in the Regulatory Treatment of 
Bitcoin, 28 No. 1 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 6 (2016) (citations omitted). 
 242. See In re TeraExchange LLC, Dkt. No. 15-33 (CFTC Sept. 24, 2015), 
http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalple
ading/enfteraexchangeorder92415.pdf (action to prohibit wash trading and prearranged 
trades on a crypto-derivatives platform); In re BXFNA Inc. d/b/a Bitfinex, Dkt. No. 16-19 
(CFTC June 2, 2016), 
http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalple
ading/enfbfxnaorder060216.pdf (action against unregistered Bitcoin futures exchange). 
 243. A “spot market,” also known as the actual or physical market, involves 
transactions in the actual commodity rather than in derivative interests such as futures. 
 244. See, e.g., CFTC v. Gelfman Blueprint, Inc., Case No. 17–7181, 2017 WL 4228737 
(S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 21, 2017) (involving a Bitcoin Ponzi scheme). In 2018, the court ruled 
in favor of the CFTC, ordering Gelfman to pay more than $2.5 million in civil monetary 
penalties and restitution. CFTC, Federal Court Orders Trading Firm and CEO to Pay More 
than $2.5 Million for Fraudulent Bitcoin Ponzi Scheme, REL. NO. 7831-18 (Oct. 18, 2018), 
https://cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/7831-18 (“This case marks yet another 
victory for the Commission in the virtual currency enforcement arena. As this string of 
cases shows, the CFTC is determined to identify bad actors in these virtual currency 
markets and hold them accountable.”). 
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fraud actions against other cryptoassets in which no futures have ever 
been traded or contemplated.245 
In CFTC v. McDonnell,246 the CFTC alleged that Patrick 
McDonnell and his company CabbageTech, Corp., dba Coin Drop 
Markets, sold memberships in crypto trading groups by falsely 
promising profits up to 300% per week.247 The CFTC specifically 
asserted that it had “concurrent regulatory power over virtual 
currency in certain settings . . ..” including the spot markets if fraud 
is involved.248 The District Court for the Eastern District of New York 
agreed,249 while noting that other administrative agencies such as the 
SEC also have partial authority over cryptoassets.250 
This decision is problematic not because it recognizes a division 
of responsibility, but because it allows for a duplication of efforts. 
While the CFTC, under the terms of the CEA, has exclusive 
jurisdiction over most derivative contracts and exchanges that trade 
such derivatives, it also has jurisdiction when there is fraud in the 
spot markets for commodities.251 Normally this would not result in 
 
 245. CFTC v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d 213, 216 (E.D.N.Y.), adhered to on denial of 
reconsideration, 321 F. Supp. 3d 366 (E.D.N.Y. 2018). 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. at 217. 
 248. Id. at 220 (citing testimony by the Chairman of the CFTC acknowledging that 
“current law does not provide any U.S. Federal regulator with such regulatory oversight 
authority over spot virtual currency platforms [not involving fraud] operating in the 
United States or abroad.”). 
 249. Id. at 221, noting actions by the SEC such as SEC v. Plexcorps, 17–CV–7007, 2017 
WL 5988934 (E.D.N.Y. Filed Dec. 1, 2017) (“This is an emergency action to stop Lacroix, a 
recidivist securities law violator in Canada, and his partner Paradis-Royer, from further 
misappropriating investor funds illegally raised through the fraudulent and unregistered 
offer and sale of securities called ‘PlexCoin’ or ‘PlexCoin Tokens’ in a purported ‘Initial 
Coin Offering.’”). 
 250. Christopher Giancarlo, Chairman Giancarlo Statement on Virtual Currencies, CFTC 
(Jan. 4, 2018) (“One thing is certain: ignoring virtual currency trading will not make it go 
away. Nor is it a responsible regulatory strategy. The CFTC has an important role to 
play.”). Cited in McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d at 221-222. 
 251. See 7 U.S.C. § 9 (banning the use of any “manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance” in connection with the sale of a commodity); 17 C.F.R. § 180.1(a) (banning 
the use of “any manipulative device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,” the making of “any 
untrue or misleading statement of a material fact,” or the use of “any act, practice, or 
course of business, which operates . . . as a fraud or deceit . . . .” in connection with the 
sale of a commodity). There are several reported decisions from various court recognizing 
the CFTC’s power to prosecute fraud under these provisions. See CFTC v. S. Tr. Metals, 
Inc., 894 F.3d 1313, 1319, 1325, 1334 (11th Cir. 2018) (affirming judgment for CFTC in 
“commodities-fraud case” alleging violations of Regulation 180.1 that “involve[d] no 
allegation . . . that the Defendants manipulated the price of a commodity”); McDonnell, 
287 F. Supp. 3d at 229 (“Language in 7 U.S.C. § 9(1), and 17 C.F.R. § 180.1, establish 
the CFTC’s regulatory authority over the manipulative schemes, fraud, and 
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significant duplication of efforts, but in the case of a commodity that 
is a security, this can result in both the CFTC and SEC devoting 
resources to address the same conduct.252 Even though both agencies 
have indicated a desire to avoid over-regulation and work together,253 
the CFTC and SEC continue to duplicate efforts.254 
While one option to avoid duplication would be to leave the 
matter to the CFTC, the reality is that agency has no experience in 
establishing standards for the cash or spot market of commodities. 
Since that is where most of the trading of Bitcoin and other 
cryptoassets occurs, and because crypto is not well understood or 
subject to self-regulation, it is especially important that the agency 
overseeing crypto have appropriate experience and authority to 
 
misleading statements alleged in the complaint.”), aff’d on reconsideration, 321 F. Supp. 3d 
366, 2018 WL 3435047 at 368 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (“Title 7 U.S.C. § 9(1) gives the CFTC standing 
to exercise its enforcement power over the fraudulent schemes alleged in the 
complaint.”); CFTC v. Hunter Wise Commodities, LLC, 21 F. Supp. 3d 1317, 1348 (S.D. Fla. 
2014) (finding defendants liable for violating Section 6(c)(1) and Regulation 180.1 in fraud 
case not involving allegations of market manipulation). But see CFTC v. Monex Credit Co., 
311 F. Supp. 3d 1173, 1185–89 (C.D. Cal. 2018) (finding that Section 6(c)(1) prohibits only 
fraud-based market manipulation). In the specific context of cryptoassets, see CFTC v. My 
Big Coin Pay, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 3d 492, 498–99 (D. Mass. 2018). 
 252. For example, on September 27, 2018, the SEC and CFTC filed parallel cases in the 
same court against the same defendant. See SEC v. 1pool Ltd., No. 1:18-cv-02244 (D.D.C. 
Sept. 27, 2018) and CFTC v. 1pool Ltd., No. 1:18-cv-02243 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2018). 
 253. See CFTC, CFTC and SEC Announce Approval of New MOU, REL. NO. 7745-18 (June 
28, 2018), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/7745-18 (noting that the SEC 
and CFTC “announced today that the two agencies have approved a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) that will help ensure continued coordination and information 
sharing between the two agencies.”) In addition, both agencies have independently 
proclaimed a desire not to stifle innovation in the crypto arena. See CFTC, Remarks of 
Commissioner Brian Quintenz before the Eurofi High Level Seminar 2018 (Apr. 26, 2018), 
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opaquintenz11 (stating that “it 
is incumbent upon regulators to create a workable and appropriate regulatory framework 
that facilitates market-enhancing innovation. This means adopting regulation that is fair, 
technology-neutral, and does not stifle positive innovations.”); Emily Gordy & Molly M. 
White, SEC 2019 FinTech Forum, CONSUMER FINSIGHTS, MCGUIREWOODS (June 13, 2019) 
[https://perma.cc/S462-J3NU] (“The SEC’s stated goal is to regulate without inhibiting 
innovation.”). 
 254. Nikhilesh De, US Authorities Charge Crypto ‘Trading Club’ Operators With 
Defrauding 150 Investors, COINDESK (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.coindesk.com/us-
authorities-charge-crypto-trading-club-operators-with-defrauding-150-investors (“The 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC) and the U.S Attorney for the Southern District of New York have 
charged Ohio resident Michael Ackerman and two unnamed business partners with 
defrauding some 150 investors by claiming to offer “extraordinary profits” from a 
cryptocurrency trading scheme.”). The involvement of the U.S. Attorney General signifies 
that the matter is criminal rather than civil and is not the same as having two agencies 
responsible for the investigation of the same behaviors. 
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promulgate requirements for compliant sales.255 Therefore, it makes 
sense to use the SEC as the starting point for targeted regulation 
outside the limited area of derivatives and exchanges for those 
derivatives. 
 
C. PREEMPTIVE AUTHORITY OVER STATE REGULATIONS 
 
Another important component of productive change is to give 
the SEC preemptive authority over state securities regulation of 
cryptoassets. At the current time, every state retains authority to 
regulate cryptoassets as securities if they so choose, and the reality is 
that state treatment of crypto varies widely.256 
Some states have issued guidance, opinion letters, or other 
information from their financial regulatory agencies regarding 
whether virtual currencies are “money” under existing state rules, 
while others have enacted piecemeal legislation amending existing 
definitions to either specifically include or exclude digital currencies 
from the definition. To use a pun those in the blockchain space should 
understand, there is a complete lack of consensus as to whether they 
do or not.257 
By way of example, Wyoming is widely recognized as being the 
most pro-crypto U.S. state.258 The Wyoming statutes exempt “digital 
 
 255. Timothy G. Massad, It’s Time to Strengthen the Regulation of Crypto-Assets Crypto-
Assets, ECONOMIC STUDIES AT BROOKINGS, 32-33 (Mar. 2019), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Timothy-Massad-Its-
Time-to-Strengthen-the-Regulation-of-Crypto-Assets-2.pdf (“When it comes to many 
commodities, such as oil or wheat, the fact that the CFTC does not have authority to set 
standards for the cash market is usually not critical, because the cash market has 
developed standards and norms over decades and may even be subject to other regulatory 
oversight. But the cash market for crypto-assets—which is where most of the trading takes 
place today—does not have well-developed standards.”). 
 256. As one source explains, “all states can assert jurisdiction over securities 
transactions involving crypto-related subject matter because there is no blanket federal 
jurisdictional preemption in securities regulation.” Bryan K. Prosek & John R. Chadd, State 
Securities Regulators Are Increasing Actions Against Cryptocurrency Issuers and Exchanges, 
NAT. L. REV (Nov. 28, 2018) [https://perma.cc/9JDZ-SCND]. The result is a patchwork of 
inconsistent approaches. Id. 
 257. Matthew E. Kohen & Justin S. Wales, State Regulations on Virtual Currency and 
Blockchain Technologies—(Updated), CARLTON FIELDS (Oct. 17, 2017; updated Apr. 19, 2019), 
https://www.carltonfields.com/insights/publications/2018/state-regulations-on-
virtual-currency-and-blockchain-technologies. 
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consumer assets” from the definition of a digital security.259 “Digital 
consumer asset” is defined as “a digital asset that is used or bought 
primarily for consumptive, personal or household purposes” other 
than as a virtual currency that is to be used “as a medium of exchange, 
unit of account or store of value.”260 
Montana is also regarded as have a pro-crypto securities regime, 
but its statutes provide an exemption for utility tokens whose 
purpose is primarily consumptive. 261 The specifics of this exemption 
require an issuer to prove that it has marketed the token for 
consumptive purposes and “does not market the utility token to be 
used for a speculative or investment purpose.”262 In addition, the 
utility token must be available at the time of the sale or within 180 
days so long as the initial buyers knowingly agree that their purchase 
is for consumption and that no resales are permitted until the 
functionality of the token is available.263 
In contrast, not every jurisdiction has enacted exemptive or 
exclusionary language for any kind of crypto assets or offerings. For 
example, on January 3, 2019, the North Dakota House introduced a 
bill which would have exempted “an open blockchain token from 
specified securities transactions and dealings.”264 The bill was, 
however, defeated on January 11, 2019. The Rhode Island House 
similarly proposed a bill that, among other things, would have 
exempted virtual currency from securities requirements.265 The bill 
was referred to the House Finance Committee and died there. 
Naturally, there are a number of arguments that can be made in 
favor and against federal preemption generally: 
Arguments commonly made in favor of federal preemption in a 
particular area include the creation of a uniform national standard, 
ease of commerce in markets of a national or global nature, and the 
concentration of expertise with a single federal regulator . . . 
Arguments against federal preemption generally include 
encouragement of policy experimentation, democratic accountability 
 
 259. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34–29–101(a)(iii). 
 260. Id. at §§ 34–29–101(a)(ii) & (iv). 
 261. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30–10–105(23). 
 262. Id. at § 30-10-105(23)(a)(ii). 
 263. Id. at § 30-10-105(23)(a)(iv). 
 264. H.B. 1043, 2019 66th Leg. Assemb., (N.D. 2019) [https://perma.cc/RE22-D5XK]. 
 265. 2019 RI H5776 (NS) (Feb. 28, 2019). – 2020 RI H7989 (March 11, 2020). 
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and maintaining the regulator as close as possible to the regulated 
entities.266 
In the context of cryptoassets, which are not local in character 
and where over-regulation runs the risk of stifling technological 
innovation, the advantages of preemption would appear to outweigh 
the disadvantages. 
It is noteworthy that this would not be the first time that the 
federal securities laws will have preempted inconsistent state 
securities regulation. The National Securities Market Improvement 
Act of 1996 (NSMIA)267 included the first express federal preemption 
of state blue-sky laws. NSMIA grants the SEC broad authority to 
preempt state regulation over any offerings to “qualified 
purchasers,” requiring only that the definition of that phrase be 
“consistent with the public interest and the protection of investors.”268 
Nonetheless, the SEC has not generally taken advantage of this 
authority, which is why this Article suggests that Congress direct 
such preemption.269 
 
D. NEW EXEMPTIONS 
 
Assuming the SEC is given exclusive and preemptive authority 
over cryptoassets as a new category of securities, it is also important 
that the agency be directed to establish appropriate, targeted 
standards for distributions of cryptoassets. While antifraud 
requirements can and should continue to be enforced based on the 
history of fraudulent distributions involving crypto,270 Congress 
should direct the SEC to promulgate exemptions from the registration 
requirements for various kinds of crypto. 
 
 266. Philip C. Berg, State vs. Federal Laws in Cryptocurrency: Blue Sky, or Running in the 
Red? MEDIUM (Dec. 4, 2018) [https://perma.cc/6A4S-F6YC]. 
 267. National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–29, 110 Stat. 
3416 (Oct. 11, 1996) (the text of the law is available online at 
https://www.congress.gov/104/plaws/publ290/PLAW-104publ290.pdf). 
 268. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(3). 
 269. Rutheford B. Campbell, The Role of Blue Sky Laws After NSMIA and the JOBS Act, 
66 DUKE L.J. 605, 617 (2016). “State regulators have vigorously and seemingly with 
renewed energy opposed the expansion of preemption. The Commission, on the other 
hand, has been unwilling to any significant degree to promote preemption.” 
 270. Creative criminals have already found myriad ways to abuse the crypto markets; 
there is no reason to suspect this will stop. See Tyler Elliot Bettilyon, Cryptocurrency’s 
Criminal Revolution, MEDIUM (Jul. 12, 2018), 
https://medium.com/s/story/cryptocurrencys-criminal-revolution-6dae3cdf630f. 
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It is true that the SEC already has broad authority to promulgate 
exemptions from registration for classes of securities “to the extent 
that such exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, 
and is consistent with the protection of investors.”271 
Notwithstanding this authority, the need for a Congressional 
mandate is clear since the SEC has shown no inclination to adopt new 
regulations, choosing instead to regulate based on preexisting rules. 
Congress could choose to amend section 4 of the Securities Act 
of 1933272 to add a new exemption from registration for cryptoassets, 
with the exception of tokenized securities that provide investors with 
governance rights and/or profits in the issuer/creator or provide for 
redemption at a profit or with interest to be paid by the issuer.273 
(Those should be treated in the same way as other equity or debt 
securities, and ordinary registration or exemption alternatives and 
conditions should apply.) Rather than spelling out the terms of such 
an exemption, the new statutory provision could provide for 
exemptions that cover such sales as the Commission may, by 
regulation, provide. The SEC could then seek input from industry 
about the parameters of the exemptions. 
Presumably, a new exemption for forms of crypto that cannot be 
characterized as tokenized debt or equity would be conditioned upon 
disclosure of certain information relevant to the value of the crypto 
(and not particularly the business of the issuer outside that context),274 
as specified by the SEC. This could include information such as the 
qualifications and background of any token development team (not 
of the issuer’s management as current forms emphasize), with more 
 
 271. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-3 (granting the SEC general exemptive authority: 
The Commission, by rule or regulation, may conditionally or unconditionally exempt any 
person, security, or transaction, or any class or classes of persons, securities, or 
transactions, from any provision or provisions of this subchapter or of any rule or 
regulation issued under this subchapter, to the extent that such exemption is necessary or 
appropriate in the public interest, and is consistent with the protection of investors.) 
 272. 15 U.S.C. § 77d (dealing with exempted transactions). 
 273. Those kinds of crypto would essentially be tokenized forms of traditional debt or 
equity securities and could be treated under existing provisions of the law without the 
need for a new exemption. Moreover, the new exemption would not adequately protect 
investors who believe they are obtaining a debt or equity stake in a business as disclosures 
would not adequately convey information about the entity in which a purchaser would 
be investing. 
 274. Note that this is a change from the current regulatory disclosure model, which 
specifically references the need to disclose information not merely about the security 
being issued but also about the company (a requirement that makes sense only if there is 
to be an investment in the company itself). See supra Part II of this Article. 
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detail being required if the token is pre-functional.275 It could also 
include a description of how outstanding coins or tokens were issued 
or pre-mined, and for what consideration, along with information 
about the extent to which the issuer and those affiliated with the 
token project retain ownership of any of those outstanding interests. 
A possible starting point for the kinds of disclosures is to 
consider who would be required to make them. For cryptoassets 
being sold by or in connection with a development team, the 
disclosures might include response to the following kinds of 
questions. What is the intended function of the token? How far along 
is it in development? Who is working on the development, and what 
are their qualifications? How will the token be issued? How many 
coins or tokens have been pre-mined or distributed, and for what 
consideration? Is there a cap on the total number of tokens to be 
created, and if so, what is it? Can the cap be changed? How disperse 
is the ownership of the token? How many of the outstanding tokens 
are owned by the issuer, the team creating the asset, or an affiliate of 
such person(s)? What will be the policies on hard forks? How are 
errors or weaknesses in the protocol to be addressed or remedied? 
Under what circumstances will transactions be reversed or stopped? 
What privacy protocols are in place, and are they mandatory or 
optional? Who will be working on promotion of the coin or token? 
Are there restrictions or limitations on resale? Are there existing 
exchanges that accept the asset? If not, will anyone be working on 
finding an exchange or trading platform that will include the coin or 
token among their interests? Note that answering these questions 
would require disclosures very similar to those proposed by SEC 
Commissioner Hester Peirce’s as part of suggestion that the SEC 
adopt a 3-year safe harbor.276 
This Article suggests that particular plans for or limits on 
transferability and liquidity should also be part of the required 
disclosures, particularly if non-accredited investors are involved. 
(This is different from the Peirce proposal, which would be limited to 
tokens that are designed to be liquid.)277 In addition, the greater the 
amount to be raised, the more detailed the required disclosures can 
reasonably be expected to be, although the SEC should learn from its 
 
 275. A pre-functional token is a cryptoasset that is not fully functional as of its launch, 
or in other words, it lacks completed programming upon issuance. 
 276. See supra notes 214-20 and accompanying text. 
 277. Peirce, Empty, supra note 214. 
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Regulation CF rules278 and avoid setting fundraising limits that are 
unrealistically low or imposing unduly burdensome ongoing 
reporting requirements. 
The ‘33 Act should also be amended to address what occurs 
when the person selling the token is not the actual developer. For 
someone not engaged in regular sales, or the business of profiting 
from speculation in crypto, it may be appropriate to have a specific 
exemption, because it is not always clear who will count as an issuer 
and therefore who would count as an underwriter. For persons who 
are engaged in the business of selling crypto, or who own a significant 
amount of a particular token, different kinds of disclosures may be 
required. For these kinds of sellers, important questions may include 
how many tokens the seller owns or controls, any connection to the 
issuer or developer(s), and what communications the seller has made 
or directed others to make that are designed to influence the pricing 
of the token. These persons may not have the other kinds of 
information that would be accessible to developers or conventional 
issuers of securities, so the required disclosures need to be 
appropriately tailored. 
The point of this discussion is not to fully describe the 
exemptions that need to be drafted. That is a process best informed 
by the notice and comment process that federal agencies such as the 
SEC are directed to follow. However, a legislative mandate is needed 
at this point to ensure that the commission does indeed adopt 
changes to help balance the need for investor protection with the 
legitimate needs of crypto entrepreneurs. 
 
E. RECAP OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The proposal outlined in this Article would result in the 
following changes. 
 
i. From the Regulators’ Perspectives 
 
 278. Regulation CF was designed to allow smaller entities to conduct crowdfunded 
securities offerings. See SEC, Regulation Crowdfunding: A Small Entity Compliance Guide for 
Issuers (May 13, 2016 with Apr. 5, 2017 updates), 
https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/secg/rccomplianceguide-051316.htm. It was 
originally limited to offerings that did not exceed $1,000,000 in any 12-month period, 
although that amount is now at $1,070,000. Because of the low offering limit, few Reg CF 
offerings have been conducted, prompting the SEC to propose raising the limit to 
$5,000,000. For a discussion of this proposal, see SEC Proposed Major Changes to Regulation 
Crowdfunding (Reg CF), INFRASHARES (Mar. 13, 2020) [https://perma.cc/Y3E3-VD8B]. 
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The most important benefit of these changes from the SEC’s 
perspective is that it would no longer need to spend resources 
litigating what is a security. By specifically including cryptoassets in 
the definition, the time and resources spent on trying to clarify or 
arguing about whether the securities laws apply to crypto would 
come to an end. This would give the SEC additional time and 
resources to provide more accurate warnings about crypto fraud. It 
would also allow the SEC to focus more of its attention on fraud, 
without needing to coordinate with or worry about overlapping with 
the CFTC’s enforcement efforts. 
In addition, the SEC would be better able to accomplish its 
mission of facilitating capital formation and avoiding the risk of 
stifling innovation by having the impetus and resources to craft more 
focused disclosures for these kinds of assets. Because crypto is a 
security, this would not compromise the commission’s ability to 
protect the public from fraudulent transactions, making the option a 
win-win. 
From the perspective of other regulators, the CFTC would no 
longer be called upon to regulate in the crypto spot markets, and state 
securities regulators would also be free to focus on fraudulent activity 
without needing to regulate the process of registration or exemptions. 
 
ii. From the Entrepreneur’s Perspective 
 
The benefits to crypto-entrepreneurs would seem to be relatively 
obvious. Instead of needing to coordinate with both the CFTC and 
SEC at the federal level, there would be a single regulator. In addition, 
and more importantly, they could expect (and have input into the 
creation of) reasonable and targeted exemptions and disclosure 
regimes. This should mean that crypto-developers would no longer 
be forced out of the U.S. markets or out of the realm of innovation 
altogether. Similarly, other crypto-based businesses such as 
exchanges and investment advisors should be able to develop 
strategies for compliance with regulatory requirements once 
appropriate rules are in place. 
 
iii. From the Public Investor’s Perspective 
 
As for investors, they would still be as protected from fraud. In 
fact, the SEC should have additional resources to focus on this kind 
of problem. At the same time, persons desiring to participate as an 
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investor in the crypto markets could expect more opportunities for 
investment. This would also be facilitated by the expansion of crypto-
based businesses such as exchanges and investor services enterprises, 





The result of the proposal presented in this Article could be a 
regime that appropriately assigns responsibilities to the SEC and 
recognizes its expertise and superior position when it comes to 
knowledge about systemic risks associated with cryptoassets. Under 
this approach, the SEC should be able to satisfy both parts of its 
mission: protection of the public and facilitating innovative capital 
formation. As a consequence of these changes in regulatory direction, 
the U.S. should wind up with a fairer and more efficient disclosure 
regime suitable for both the issuer and investors. Finally, investors 
would be recognized as being responsible for their own decisions. To 
the extent that it is their decision where to store and exchange their 
crypto, they should be responsible for the risks of cyber failures. They 
should also accept the risk of problems such as those caused by 
market volatility, and other risks that are outside the control of any 
particular person. 
The thrust of this Article is not that regulation of cryptoassets is 
unnecessary or that the SEC is the wrong regulator for the developing 
technology. However, the current system creates a number of issues 
that could be resolved with legislative intervention. These include the 
current resources that are devoted to trying to apply the Howey test, 
the awkwardness of applying existing disclosure obligations to an 
asset that simply works differently than conventional securities, and 
a regulatory focus that duplicates efforts. 
As a result of the inefficiencies and uncertainties associated with 
the current regime, potential issuers are prevented from offering 
potentially valuable interests or from funding potentially viable 
businesses because of the cost of regulatory compliance, and 
investors are foreclosed from opportunities in which they may desire 
to participate. Even entrepreneurs who elect to proceed with 
offerings are often driven out of the U.S. or forced to pass along 
unnecessarily higher costs to potential purchasers. Investors who 
think they are being protected by current disclosure requirements are 
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not, because the most relevant information is either not provided or 
buried in so much other information that it is not accessible. 
Making it clear that crypto is a security (and therefore subject to 
the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws), but 
presumptively exempting it from the requirements of registration 
seems to be the most efficient approach. An exemption from 
registration does not mean that no disclosures are required, but 
instead it allows the disclosure paradigm of a generally available 
exemption to focus on the actual concerns that are likely to be most 
relevant to potential purchasers. It will allow the SEC take resources 
away from the focus on “when is crypto a security,” and direct them 
instead to “what kinds of information do purchasers of crypto 
reasonably need to know, that issuers/developers can reasonably be 
expected to provide”? That seems to be a far more efficient and 
productive utilization of resources than is currently being witnessed. 
Obviously, as is the case with current exemptions, if a 
distribution is accomplished through fraud or deception, with 
misleading or inaccurate information in the offering or advertising 
materials, a cause of action for fraud should still be available. But for 
compliant issuers, a different approach would definitely seem to be 
superior to the current regulatory structures that leaves too many 
possible crypto developers with the equivalent of bleeding feet 
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